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This module will introduce students to formal (game theoretic) models in political economy with an emphasis on their utility for understanding empirical patterns across countries and time periods. Formal theory has long been used in political science to analyse strategic interactions between political actors---whether voters, politicians, bureaucrats, or organisations---and to deepen our theoretical understanding of the political world. With the profusion of data now available to analyse such interactions, formal models can be used to structure empirical enquiry and reconcile otherwise puzzling patterns in the data.

The course will begin with an introduction to formal models: what they are and why they are used, before running through the basic concepts needed for solving models and defining equilibria. With these foundations in hand, the module will then focus on a set of distinct classes of models designed to explain specific political phenomena---these might include models of electoral competition, political agency, or distributive politics. Within each topic, we will work through benchmark models in the literature and draw out a set of their empirical implications. We will then adjudicate between these implications and existing evidence, by reviewing and discussing studies that draw on such models to explain empirical patterns. Wherever relevant, we will consider how complexities in the real world – such as those introduced by specific cases or intuitions – can (and have) been used to go back and enhance existing models. Throughout, the module will discuss the tradeoffs implicit in formal models of political economy and their relationship with empirical analysis.

Students are strongly recommended to have some background in basic calculus to facilitate solving models. They would also strongly benefit from experience in quantitative statistical analysis to make the most of the empirical aspects of the course.

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