

INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, fortress conservation and central government control have been accompanied by policies and legislation that put communities in focus for conserving natural resources in the Global South (Roe et al. 2009). Much has been written about community-based approaches to conservation (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Songorwa et al. 2000; Balint 2006; Ribot et al. 2006; Nelson 2007; Dressler et al. 2010), illustrating

all too well the need for continued critical observation and concern. A number of labels for community-based conservation (CBC) schemes have been promoted in the context of wildlife conservation, such as community wildlife managament (CWM) (Balint 2007), CBC (Goldman 2003) or community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) (Nelson and Citcycn" 422:+0"Cm" vjgug" uejgogu" ctg" v{rkecm{"fgŁpgf" cu" systems of resource governance, whereby the rules for resource allocation and management are primarily set by communities themselves (Li 2005: 435).

CBC schemes are uncritically hailed by proponents from government and non-government sectors alike to be

in the virtues of participatory policies if: a) a wide range of information is available to local communities to enable informed decision making (Arnstein 1969; Parkins and Okvejgm" 4227="Hgtpcpfg|/Ikogpg|"gv"cn0" 422:="Vwtpjqwv" et al. 2010); b) meaningful powers to manage resources are actually devolved to democratically elected local bodies that are downwardly accountable to their electorate (Smoke 2003; Tkdqv"4223."4226+="cpf"e+"uwduvcpvkcn"dgpgŁvu"ecp"dg" igpgtcvgf" and captured by the communities to improve their well-being (Homewood et al. 2012).

Vep | cpkep" Ykn f nkhg" Ocpc i g o gpv" Ctgcu"* Y O Cu+"tgrtgugpv" such a policy for community-based wildlife conservation that is hailed to be participatory and community-owned (WWF 2014; AWF n.d.), because WMAs seem to constitute a break with past, more centralised and exclusion-based approaches, i.e., fortress conservation (Brockington 2002). Critical voices see them as non-participatory, overly focused on conservation, and neoliberal in the sense of expanding the territories and resources that can be commoditised with little attention to local concerns and rural development (Goldman 2003; Igoe and Croucher 2007; Benjaminsen and Svarstad 2010; Benjaminsen et al. 2013). The literature on the politics of participation is typically inspired by a rich set of critical perspectives on participation (Ribot 1999; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Hickey and Mohan 2005; Cornwall 2008), continuously offering etkvkswg" rgtvckpkp i "vq" eq o o wpkv{/eqpugtxcvkqp" tgncvkqpu" kp" Pqtvjgtp"Vcp|cpkc"*Dgplcokpugp"cpf"Uxctuvcf."4232="Iqnfocp" 2011; Mariki 2013; Loveless 2014) and potential ways to move dg{qpf"vjg"etkvkswg"* I qnfocp"cpf"Oknnkct{"4236+0" Ykvj"vjku" article, we wish to explicitly examine an often overlooked, albeit a core assumption of WMAs. That is, in what sense their governance fosters or at least allows for popular participation in decision-making over rules that regulate access to land,

METHODOLOGY AND CASE DESCRIPTION

Yg"wug"g o rktkecn"fcvc"eqnngevgf"htq o "c"Lgnf"uvwf { "kp"Dwtwpig" Y O C"kp" Pqtv j gtp" Vcp | cpkc0" Y g"tgn { "qp"c"tgxkg y "qh"tgngxcpv" rqnke { "fqew o gpvu"cpf"qp" swcnkvcvkxg" fcvc"eq o rkngf"vjtqwij" observation (in two village assemblies, three CBO meetings, and one meeting of Village Game Scouts), semi-structured and unstructured interviews with agro-pastoralists and farmers (individually and in focus groups, >100 interviews), village and traditional leaders (>40 interviews), members and employees of the CBO (13 interviews), Village Game Scouts (individually and in focus groups, 23 interviews), fkuvtkev"qhŁegtu"*Łxg"kpvgtxkgyu+."okpkuvt{"tgrtgugpvcvkxgu"*hqwt" interviews and continuous email exchange), conservation NGO representatives (four interviews), investors (two interviews), and Protected Area authorities (one interview with three Vcp|cpkcp" Pcvkqpcn" Rctm" Cwvjqtkv { "tgrtgugpvcvkxgu+0" Fcvc" were collected in all Burunge WMA villages, in Babati town (District centre), in Arusha (Regional centre) and in Dar es Salaam (location of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Vqwtku o +0" V j g" Łgn f" y qtm" y cu" eqp f wevg f" htq o "Lcpwct { "vq" May 2014, and in February, May, and November 2015 by the authors—either in parallel at different locations or jointly.

We deal with highly sensitive and contentious issues of ncpf"qypgtujkr."nqecn"eqpłkevu."cpf"etkokpcnk|gf"ceeguu"vq"conservation territories. To build reliable narratives of events cpf"eqpłkevu"y g"vtkcpi wncvgf"*Pki jvkpi cng"4225+"d{"vcmkpi "vq" actors across all levels of WMA governance and local politics, and we used high-resolution satellite images (Google Earth) to gain a better understanding of different land uses and spatial tgncvkqpu"kp"vjg"ctgc0"Vtkcpi wncvkqp"vgej pkswgu"fq"pqv"cn yc {u" yield consistent accounts, and can produce discrepancies and incompatibilities between different sets of data (Nightingale 2003). This dissonance, however, is telling in multiple ways,

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grid have been launched. Access to water remains a challenge for all.

Rcuv" eqpugtxcvkqp" ghhqtvu" uswgg | gf" vjg" nqecn" rqrwncvkqp" between a network of various types of protected areas. Burunge WMA is located within the Tarangire-Manyara Ecosystem (TME), that also encompasses Tarangire National Park *ic|gwgf"kp"3;92+."Ncmg" Ocp{ctc" Pcvkqpcn" Rctm"*ic|gwgf" in 1960), Manyara Ranch (since 2000, operated by African Wildlife Foundation), and a newly established Randileni WMA *ic|gwgf"kp"4234."vq"tgrnceg"vjg"Nqmkucng" I cog" Eqpvtqmgf" Area, not mapped here) (Figure 1). From a conservationist point of view the priorities are to maintain the ecological integrity of the entire ecosystem by protecting wildlife corridors, enabling wildlife to safely migrate across borders within TME (Goldman 2009; Jones et al. 2009; Kikoti 2009).

ANALYSING RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN WMAS: RIGHTS, POWERS, AND RELATIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

WMA policy aims to establish restrictions on local land use and access to natural resources in return for a share of tourism

The Ministry had no role to play in non-consumptive tourism on village land. The village governments could enter into direct negotiations with tour operators and lodging investors, negotiating a shared land-use regime that could entail self-imposed restrictions on access to land and resources to secure an attractive safari experience for visitors, and keep all the revenues (Nelson et al. 2007; Schroeder 2008; Sachedina and Nelson 2010). Obviously, communities would prefer self-negotiated non-consumptive tourism activities on their village land as opposed to having to host non-accountable j wpvkp i "qwvŁvvgtu0" V j g" O kpkuvt {." j q y gxgt." dgpgŁvg f "htq o " vqwtkuv" j wpvkpi "Łpcpekcnn {."cpf" jcf" nkvvng" kpvgtguv" kp" uggkpi" the villages interfere with hunting activities by hosting tourism safaris through direct contracts with safari operators (Snyder and Sulle 2011). The growing competition between consumptive and non-consumptive tourism activities within hunting blocks on village land has led the central government to pass a number of reforms to regulate in favour of tourist hunting, banning any kind of tourism activities within a hunting block without the approval of the Director of Wildlife, and introducing new fees on all tourism activities (URT 2000, 2008; Nelson 2011; Snyder and Sulle 2011).

The evolution of wildlife conservation and tourism reforms was paralleled by deliberations over a comprehensive policy for devolved and community-based wildlife conservation.

What powers remain with the central government?

The Director of Wildlife retains its powers to authorise key proposals put forward by the CBO, such as the allocation of a hunting block within a WMA, the choice of tourism investors, the stipulations within the General Management Plan, that is tgiwncvkpi"nqecn" rgqrngøu" ceeguu" vq" xknncig" ncpfu" kpukfg" vjg' WMA, and the collection and distribution of tourism-based revenues on WMA territory.

In 2014, the decision by the former Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism has freed several tour operators in three WMAs from paying entry and motor vehicle fees for tourists staying in WMA lodges in a move that by-passed the parliament (Letter by the Minister of Natural Resources cpf" Vqwtku o "vq" Vcp | cpkc" Cuuqekcvkqp" qh" Vqwt" Qrgtcvqtu.' 22.12.2014), effectively reducing WMA revenues from tourist visitors from USD 25 to USD 15 per person. This incident is telling in multiple ways: it demonstrates the bargaining power of tour operators who negotiate tourist fees directly with the Okpkuvt { "* o g o dgt"qh"Vcp | cpkc "Cuuqekcvkqp"qh"Vqwt "Qrgtcvqtu." pers. comm. 2015), while the villages have no say; it shows vjg"rqygt"qh"vjg"Okpkuvt{"vq"fgekfg"cpf"kpłwgpeg"jqy"owej WMA villages will be able to generate from WMA-based tourism; and it invites patronage and rent-seeking (Nelson and Agrawal 2008; Benjaminsen et al. 2013).

Furthermore, correspondence from Burunge CBO to the Wildlife Division shows that the latter distributes a part of collected revenues to the CBO erratically, with delays and often without a way to trace back the payments to the respective investors and tourism activities, making the revenue generation and distribution non-transparent (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012; WWF 2014). This does not allow the CBO to effectively jqnf"vjg" Yknfnkhg" Fkxkukqp"vq"ceeqwpv."cpf"kv" o cmgu"cfgswcvg' Łpcpekcn"rncppkpi"fkhŁewnv"cv"vjg"EDQ"cpf"xknncig"ngxgn0

Perhaps most important and far-reaching is the continuous uvevg" qypgtujkr" qh" enn" yknfnkhg" kp" Vcp | cpkc" *WTV" 422; +.' allowing the CBO-on behalf of the Wildlife Division-to retain user rights over wildlife on village land and to manage and dgpg&v" htq o " y knfnkhg" wvknkucvkqp" hqt" vqwtku o " cevkxkvkgu." gxgp" if the village leaves the WMA (URT 2012, section 34(6)), creating tensions and ambiguities with the Village Land Act No.

in the context of WMA-based tourism villagers can only eq o rnckp"cdqwv"kpxguvqtuø"eqpfwev."dwv"vjg{"ecppqv" o cmg"cp" investor leave, as the contract is signed between the CBO and the investor. The most important mechanism to hold the CBO downwardly accountable to the villagers is the power granted to villagers to elect and remove CBO representatives. While this right can be easily exercised in practice, the establishment of a supra-village CBO does not promote the empowerment of existing village government organs (Shivji 2002; Ribot 2004; Nelson 2007) and weakens accountability links that are already available, because the CBO is spatially further detached from the villagers than the village government that tgukfgu"kp"vjg"xknncig"qhŁeg0"Hqt"oquv"xknncigu."c"EDQ"jcu" kvu" jgcfswctvgtu" jgwtu."kh"pqv"c" fc{"vtkr"c yc{."fgrgpfkpi"qp" distance, terrain, means of available transport, and season. Burunge villagers are arguably least affected by this, having a tarmac road cutting through the region, but for communities in more remotely located WMAs this is a serious burden and barrier to access their CBO (e.g., Lake Natron, Makame, the Y O Cu"kp"v j g"Ugnqwu/Pkcuuc"Eqttkfqt"kp"Uqwv j gtp"Vcp | cpkc+0" With the recentralisation of resource management from the xknncig"qhLeg"wr"vq"vjg"EDQ."pgiqvkcvkqpu"qxgt"ceeguu"vq"uqog" of the resources are also recentralised to the CBO level away htqo"xknncig"eqookvyggu."uwej"cu"nkxguvqem"itc|kpi."eqnngevkqp" qh"Ltgyqqf."vjcvej."qt" ogfkekpcn"rncpvu0"Vjg"dctickpkpi"rqygt" of villagers also diminishes if people from several villages have to lobby the CBO through village representatives instead of attending village assemblies where demands can be expressed directly to an elected village council.

We conclude that the CBO is upwardly accountable to the Wildlife Division, that makes state policy and regulations, gives authority to the CBO to manage the WMA, and can take this authority away. Given the strong relations of accountability dgv y ggp"v j g"EDQ"cpf"v j g"Yknfnkhg"Fkxkukqp. "EDQøu"fq y p y ctf" accountability to the communities is relatively weakened. That is to say, it does not matter much who will be elected vq"tgrtgugpv"vjg"xknncigtu"cv"vjg"EDQ."kh"EDQøu"rqygtu" to do what the villagers like it to do are limited by state policy and regulations that give the Director of Wildlife key decision-making powers in community-based natural resource management. At the same time, the CBO holds the villagers accountable to the rules over access, and it can enforce many qh"vjgug"twngu"vjtqwij"hqteg"qt"Lpcpekcn"ucpevkqpkpi0" Jgpeg." WMA villages are trapped into relations of accountability vjcv" o cmg" kv" fkhŁewnv" vq" ngxgtcig" rqnkvkecn" rq y gt" vq" ejcpig" rules that govern rural livelihoods in their communities. In qvjgt" yqtfu."vjgtg"ku"pq"÷dcncpeg"qh"rqygtuø"*Q{qpq"4226+" to effectively hold community representatives (i.e., CBO members) accountable at the village level.

BURUNGE WMA: GOVERNANCE THROUGH COERCION AND LEGAL STRUGGLES

In the following section we review some of the evidence

Understanding Resource Conficts in Tanzanian WMAs / 225

Park and hosting two tourist lodges, located in Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu, respectively (cf. Figure 2). The Hunting Use Zone spans the villages Kakoi, Vilima Vitatu, Ngolei, Mwada



of the WMA and won a legal case against the CBO and the village government, but efforts to evict the people continue to this day. Farming restrictions on Burunge WMA land in the villages Manyara, Magara, and Maweni are not policed d{"EDQ@u"xkmcig"icog"ueqwvu"hqt"xctkqwu"tgcuqpu."kpenwfkpi" the challenge to patrol wetland areas and contesting claims to land ownership.

EDQøu" rqygtu" vq" ejcpig" cttcpig ogpvu" kp" tgurqpug" vq" eqpłkevu"ctg"qhvgp"eqpuvtckpgf"d{"jkijgt"ngxgnu"qh"iqxgtpogpv." poor understanding of the land laws or simply reluctance to listen to WMA communities.

This is a complicated process. The village would have vq" tgswguv" vq" ejcpig" dqwpfctkgu" cv" vjg" Cwvjqtkugf" Cuuqekcvkqp"]k0g0." vjg" EDQ_." vjg" Cwvjqtkugf" Association would have to ask the District and the Wildlife Division. Burunge WMA does not accept uwej" tgswguvu." dgecwug" xkmcigu" yqwnf" mggr" cumkpi" for more and more changes. (interview with former member of Burunge CBO, 2015).

J cxkp i "c"eqpugtxcvkqp" P I Q"cpf"v j g"Fkuvtkev" I c o g"QhŁegt" as facilitators and watchmen further reduces incentives to listen to demands from below.

Cmj qwi j"y g"j cxg"xkmc i g"tgrtgugpvcvkxgu"]cv"vjg"EDQ_."
they are not well educated and not well aware of legal issues, so the District and Wildlife Division impose their own will on WMA. Authorised Association [i.e., vjg"EDQ_" o g o dgtu"ctg"uq o gvk o gu"vtkemg f"d{"Fkuvtkev" and other authorities by being taken to seminars and treated nicely. Authorised Association members feel obliged to accept whatever is told them. They forget that they should be representing the villagers. Only few Authorised Association members are strong enough to keep representing the village needs. (interview with member of Olasiti village government, 2014)

Community struggles over access to grazing land

Qpg"qh"Dwtwpigøu"xknncigu"wugf"vq"dg"rctv"qh"cpqvigt"xknncig" wpvkn" cdqwv" Łxg" { gctu" ciq." y j gp" kv" ugrctcvg f" cp f" dgec o g" independent. The newly created village had to be sensitised d{"vig" Fkuvtkev" I cog" QhLegt"cpg y "vq" dg" rgtuwcfgf" vq" lqkp" Dwtwpig" Y O C0" Ykvj"vjg"cvvckpgf"kpfgrgpfgpeg."cm"itc | kpi" land set aside during the WMA establishment remained with the old village. To complicate matters, the new village is located next to and overlaps with the WMA hunting block, an area that has been traditionally used by livestock keepers htqo"cflcegpv"eqoowpkvkgu"hqt"ft{"ugcuqp"itc|kpi0"Kp"4235." the hunting block has been taken over by a new investor who does not offer any hunting tourism, but uses the concession for non-consumptive (safari) activities throughout the year. Until recently, livestock keepers from the new village believed that the village leadership gave away their land to the WMA, while the leadership sees itself as being lured into accepting the WMA, not being fully informed about the challenges during

the sensitisation process (interview with former member of village government, 2015).

Pqv"jcxkpi"gpqwij"ncpf"hqt"ft{"ugcuqp"d ug

by the investor; they blame the CBO, not the investor, for having negotiated an arrangement that is disadvantageous to vjg"eq o o wpkvkguø"ceeguu"vq"ncpf"hqt"ft{"ugcuqp"itc|kpi0"Vjku" is further supported by the fact, that according to the contract dgv y ggp"v j g"EDQ."v j g"kpxguvqt"+c i tgguø"pqv"vq"cnnq y "nkxguvqem" kp"vjg"jwpvkpi"dnqem"vjtqwijqwv"vjg"{gct0"Kp"cffkvkqp"vq"itc|kpi" restrictions, people living close to the hunting block are cut qhh" htq o "ceeguu" vq" ft { "Łtg y qq f" cp f" eqpuvtwevkqp" o cvgtkcnu" (poles and thatch). Being too far from alternative areas that allow access, villagers see themselves forced to enter the j wpvkp i "dngem"knng i cnn {."tkumkp i "Łpgu"cp f "gzeguukxg" rwpku j o gpv0" Ogodgtu"qh"vjg"pgy "xkmcig"mggr"tgswguvkpi "vq"ejcpig"vjg"twngu" of access to the hunting block to ease the situation ever since the new investor took over the hunting block in 2013. Their pleas jcxg"dggp"tglgevgf"d{"vjg"EDQ0"Vq"vjg"eqpvtct{."\perpxknncig" leaders were imprisoned and sued in court for trespassing and herding livestock in the hunting block (Criminal Case 3:414236."Tgukfgpvøu"Ocikuvtcvg"Eqwtv"qh"Ocp{ctc+0"Vjg"hcev" vjcv"vjg"kpxguvqt"ku"pqv"vjg"ncpf"÷qypgtø"cu"ytqpihwnn{"uvcvgf" in the court documents, but only an investor on village land, fqgu"pqv"cnnqy"jko"vq"uwg"xknncigtu"kp"c"÷etkokpcn"qhhgpegø"hqt" trespassing through village land (Edward Lekaita pers. comm. 2016). Likely for that reason the charges were eventually dropped (Defendants and lawyer pers. comm. 2015).

As of 2015, after a series of violent confrontations between nqecn" jgtfgtu"cpf" v jg"kpxguvqtøu" i wctfu. "v jg"kpxguvqt" tgcnkugf" that insisting on exclusive access to the hunting block will only rtqfweg"oqtg"eqplkevu"ykvj "nqecn"eqoowpkvkgu0"Vjgtghqtg."vjg" investor is changing the strategy towards more negotiations and room for concessions (Bluwstein, in preparation). Remarkably, it was not the CBO leadership but the investor who realised vjcv"qpn{"pgiqvkcvkqpu"ecp"uqnxg"vjg"jctf/gfigf"eqpłkevu"ykvj" local herders.

When conservation competes with rice cultivation

The two communities next to Lake Manyara became independent years ago. After secession from an old village (at the time of WMA establishment) parts of WMA land in these new villages were taken for rice cultivation by local het o gtu"cpf"Lujgt o gp. "pqp/tgukfgpv"ncpf"q y pgtu. "cpf"c o qpiuv" qvigtu."fkuvtkev"qhŁekcnu0"Kp"cffkvkqp."uq o g"xknncigtu"guvcdnkuigf" settlements inside the WMA. Both communities are dependent on agriculture and have little wildlife to offer, which does not make the villages interesting for tourism. The two communities surrendered a relatively small part of village land to the YOC."uwdugswgpvn{"dgpg\(\) vkpi"htqo" YOC" tgxgpwgu"vjcv" are generated in other villages. The CBO did not succeed in enforcing the rules given the terrain (wetlands), and the fact, vjcv"uq o g"qh"vjg"hct o gtu"ctg"fkuvtkev"qhŁekcnu0"õK"c o "Iwuv"c" o qwug" against the elephants" (member of village government, 2015). õVjg"XGQ2 cannot stop his bosses from farming on WMA land" (member of Village Natural Resource Council, 2015).

In July 2014, the CBO decided to stop paying both villages parts of their share of WMA revenues, putting pressure on the villages. One of the villages asked the CBO to change the WMA boundaries to release the land that is used for settlements from being part of WMA, because they cannot resettle people without force and they lack village funds to compensate them. Both village governments are also trying to clear the WMA (more than USD 300,000 by the end of 2015, own estimation). As of July 2016, the court has ruled in favour of this village, potentially creating a legal precedent for other WMA villages cetquu"Vcp|cpkc"kpvgtguvgf"kp"rwnnkpi "qwv"qh"c" Y OC0

'If this is a community project, then who is the community?'

Vig"swguvkqp"ycu"tckugf"d{"c"Mcmqk"xknncigt"kp"c"eqpxgtucvkqp" cdqwv"Dwtwpig"YOC0"Kv"tglgevu"c"igpgtcn"fkueqpvgpv"ykvj"vjg" YOC0"Vjg"xctkqwu"eqpłkevu"cpf"rgtegkxgf"kplwuvkegu"jcxg" led to a number of violent incidents in Burunge WMA in the past few years. Local people were incited to destroy WMA infrastructure. Several village game scouts have been beaten up by a group of Barabaig residents when a Barabaig woman was apprehended by a WMA village game scout for cutting a tree inside the WMA. During the dry season in 2014, Warusha residents collectively decided to enter the hunting block with their livestock and their spears seeking direct confrontation with the security forces, which led to an injured guard of the hunting block operator. Several legal cases have been pursued by WMA actors and village governments to safeguard the territorial integrity of Burunge WMA against its own residents. Many of the people whom we talked to and who ctg"pqv"chŁnkcvgf" y kvj"vjg"EDQ. "kpukuvgf" vjcv"EDQ" o g o dgtu' either do not represent them, or are powerless to do what their eqpuvkvwgpekgu"gzrgevu"v j g o "vq"fq0"õV j gug"rgqrng"dgeq o g"rctv" of CBO once they are elected. They stop caring about us, they only think about their stomachs" (Member of Kakoi village government, interview 2014).

We can barely recognise the participating villages when y g"nqqm"hqt"vjg"÷Eø in CBNRM or CBC, rather it seems to us vjcv"cv"dguv"kv"ku"vjg"EDQ"vjcv"ku"vjg"cevwcn"÷eqoowpkv{ø."kh"yg" follow the framing of a WMA as community-based natural tguqwteg" o cpc i g o gpv0"V j ku"Łvu" y gnn" y kv j "qwt"cpcn { uku"qh"cevqtu" and powers in WMA governance. The CBO is positioned to o cmg" twngu" vj cv" i qxgtp" rgqrngøu" ceeguu" vq" ncpf" cpf" pcvwtcn" resources, and the CBO is vested with authority and powers to enforce the rules and to withstand pressure from below to modify them, while the central government is-supported by the facilitators from the District and NGOs-making sure that the rules are following the logic of conservation corridors Łtuv. "cpf" twtcn "fgxgnqrogpv" ugeqpf0" Vjg "ghhgevu "qp" rgqrngøu" livelihoods begin to emerge. Being an area where human and livestock population have been on the rise for years, eq o o wpkvkgu" o quv" u swgg | gf" d{ "eqpugtxcvkqp" vgttkvqtkgu" cpf" gzrqugf"vq"cp"kpygpukh{kpi"jwocp/yknfnkhg"eqpłkev"*gurgekcnn{" in Kakoi) are increasingly looking for opportunities to rent hctoncpf"cpf"itc|g"nkxguvqem"qwvukfg"qh"Dwtwpig"YOC0" Despite the promise of rural development through WMA o g o dgtu j kr." vqwtku o /dcug f" tgxgpwgu" ecppqv" dg" uwhŁekgpvn {" captured by the communities to represent viable options for alternative livelihood strategies. Instead, sesame has become a popular cash crop in response to intensifying crop damage by wildlife, which makes the cultivation of corn-a key staple food-a risky endeavour, and has the potential to transform food

security strategies for those who ostensibly become dependent on markets instead of subsistence farming.

CONCLUSION

With this article we have shown how WMA governance distributes rights to land and resources to different actors and regulates access in a way that villagers feel disempowered to hold their representatives at the CBO to account. We have also argued that the prevalent conservation bias acts as a backdrop to WMA governance, inhibiting genuine participation in decisions over management goals and access to land and pcvwtcn" tguqwtegu0" Eqpugswgpvn {."vjg" i gpgtcn" o cpc i g o gpv" rncp" j ctfn {"tg ł gevu"nqecn"pggfu"cpf"eqpfkvkqpu."ngc fkpi "vq" qt"



230 / Bluwstein et al.

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- and Development in East African Rangelands (eds. Homewood, K., P. Kristjanson, and P.C. Trench). 1st edition. Pp. 418. New York, NY: Springer.
- Turnhout, E., S. Van Bommel, and N. Aarts. 2010. How participation creates ekvk|gpuc" rctvkekrcvqt{"iqxgtpcpeg"cu"rgthqtocvkxg"rtcevkeg()" Ecology and Society 15(4).
- URT 1982. The Local Government (District Authorities) Act No.7. Dar es Ucacc o ."Wpkvgf"Tgrwdake"qh"Vcp|cpkc0

