

INTRODUCTION


In recent decades, fortress conservation and central government control have been accompanied by policies and legislation that put communities in focus for conserving natural resources in the Global South (Roe et al. 2009). Much has been written about community-based approaches to conservation (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Songorwa et al. 2000; Balint 2006; Ribot et al. 2006; Nelson 2007; Dressler et al. 2010), illustrating

all too well the need for continued critical observation and concern. A number of labels for community-based conservation (CBC) schemes have been promoted in the context of wildlife conservation, such as community wildlife management (CWM) (Balint 2007), CBC (Goldman 2003) or community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) (Nelson and Cibulchew 2002; Cunniff 2003; Jorgensen 2003; Ribot and Larson 2004) systems of resource governance, whereby the rules for resource allocation and management are primarily set by communities themselves (Li 2005: 435).

CBC schemes are uncritically hailed by proponents from government and non-government sectors alike to be

in the virtues of participatory policies if: a) a wide range of information is available to local communities to enable informed decision making (Arnstein 1969; Parkins and Okeve j gmn 4227="Hgtpcpfg|/Iko gpg|"gv"cn0"422:="Vwtpjqwv" et al. 2010); b) meaningful powers to manage resources are actually devolved to democratically elected local bodies that are downwardly accountable to their electorate (Smoke 2003; Tkdq"4223."4226+="cpf"e+"uwduwcpvkcn"dgpgŁvu"ecp"dg"i gpgtcvgf" and captured by the communities to improve their well-being (Homewood et al. 2012).


Vcp|cpkcp"Yknfnkhg"Opcp ig o gpv"Ctgcu"*YOCu+"tgrtgugpv" such a policy for community-based wildlife conservation that is hailed to be participatory and community-owned (WWF 2014; AWF n.d.), because WMAs seem to constitute a break with past, more centralised and exclusion-based approaches, i.e., fortress conservation (Brockington 2002). Critical voices see them as non-participatory, overly focused on conservation, and neoliberal in the sense of expanding the territories and resources that can be commoditised with little attention to local concerns and rural development (Goldman 2003; Igoe and Croucher 2007; Benjaminsen and Svarstad 2010; Benjaminsen et al. 2013). The literature on the politics of participation is typically inspired by a rich set of critical perspectives on participation (Ribot 1999; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Hickey and Mohan 2005; Cornwall 2008), continuously offering etkvkswg"rgtvckpkpi"vq"eqo o wkv{/eqpugtxcvkqp"tgncvkqpu"kp" Pqtvjgtp"Vcp|cpkcp"Dgplc o kpugp"cpf"Uxctuvf."4232="Iqnf o cp" 2011; Mariki 2013; Loveless 2014) and potential ways to move dg{qpf"vjg"etkvkswg"*Iqnf o cp"cpf"Okmkct{"4236+0"Ykvj"vjku" article, we wish to explicitly examine an often overlooked, albeit a core assumption of WMAs. That is, in what sense their governance fosters or at least allows for popular participation in decision-making over rules that regulate access to land,



METHODOLOGY AND CASE DESCRIPTION

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We deal with highly sensitive and contentious issues of ncpf" qy pgtujkr. "nqecn" eqp ħkevu. "cpf" etko kpcnk |gf" ceeguu" vq" conservation territories. To build reliable narratives of events cpf"eqp ħkevu" yg"vtkcpi wncvfg" Pki jvkpci ng"4225+"d { "vcnmkpi "vq" actors across all levels of WMA governance and local politics, and we used high-resolution satellite images (Google Earth) to gain a better understanding of different land uses and spatial tgnvcvqpu"kp"vjg"ctgc" Vtkcpi wncvqpvge jpkswgu" fq"pqv"cnyc {u" yield consistent accounts, and can produce discrepancies and incompatibilities between different sets of data (Nightingale 2003). This dissonance, however, is telling in multiple ways, a62h004C0119AD 7oan0 Tw 1 toghtingale actorAactor004700520003>-29.2005BIT0esCern00046 Tc 0.1255SñmHEV003005Vap B11



grid have been launched. Access to water remains a challenge for all.

Between a network of various types of protected areas, Burunge WMA is located within the Tarangire-Manyara Ecosystem (TME), that also encompasses Tarangire National Park (in 1960), Manyara Ranch (since 2000, operated by African Wildlife Foundation), and a newly established Randileni WMA Area, not mapped here) (Figure 1). From a conservationist point of view the priorities are to maintain the ecological integrity of the entire ecosystem by protecting wildlife corridors, enabling wildlife to safely migrate across borders within TME (Goldman 2009; Jones et al. 2009; Kikoti 2009).




**ANALYSING RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN
WMAS: RIGHTS, POWERS, AND RELATIONS OF
ACCOUNTABILITY**

WMA policy aims to establish restrictions on local land use and access to natural resources in return for a share of tourism

The Ministry had no role to play in non-consumptive tourism on village land. The village governments could enter into direct negotiations with tour operators and lodging investors, negotiating a shared land-use regime that could entail self-imposed restrictions on access to land and resources to secure an attractive safari experience for visitors, and keep all the revenues (Nelson et al. 2007; Schroeder 2008; Sachedina and Nelson 2010). Obviously, communities would prefer self-negotiated non-consumptive tourism activities on their village land as opposed to having to host non-accountable the villages interfere with hunting activities by hosting tourism safaris through direct contracts with safari operators (Snyder and Sulle 2011). The growing competition between consumptive and non-consumptive tourism activities within hunting blocks on village land has led the central government to pass a number of reforms to regulate in favour of tourist hunting, banning any kind of tourism activities within a hunting block without the approval of the Director of Wildlife, and introducing new fees on all tourism activities (URT 2000, 2008; Nelson 2011; Snyder and Sulle 2011).

The evolution of wildlife conservation and tourism reforms was paralleled by deliberations over a comprehensive policy for devolved and community-based wildlife conservation.




What powers remain with the central government?

The Director of Wildlife retains its powers to authorise key proposals put forward by the CBO, such as the allocation of a hunting block within a WMA, the choice of tourism investors, the stipulations within the General Management Plan, that is the WMA, and the collection and distribution of tourism-based revenues on WMA territory.

In 2014, the decision by the former Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism has freed several tour operators in three WMAs from paying entry and motor vehicle fees for tourists staying in WMA lodges in a move that by-passed the parliament (Letter by the Minister of Natural Resources 22.12.2014), effectively reducing WMA revenues from tourist visitors from USD 25 to USD 15 per person. This incident is telling in multiple ways: it demonstrates the bargaining power of tour operators who negotiate tourist fees directly with the pers. comm. 2015), while the villages have no say; it shows WMA villages will be able to generate from WMA-based tourism; and it invites patronage and rent-seeking (Nelson and Agrawal 2008; Benjaminsen et al. 2013).

Furthermore, correspondence from Burunge CBO to the Wildlife Division shows that the latter distributes a part of collected revenues to the CBO erratically, with delays and often without a way to trace back the payments to the respective investors and tourism activities, making the revenue generation and distribution non-transparent (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012; WWF 2014). This does not allow the CBO to effectively

Perhaps most important and far-reaching is the continuous allowing the CBO—on behalf of the Wildlife Division—to retain user rights over wildlife on village land and to manage and if the village leaves the WMA (URT 2012, section 34(6)), creating tensions and ambiguities with the Village Land Act No.




in the context of WMA-based tourism villagers can only
 investor leave, as the contract is signed between the CBO and
 the investor. The most important mechanism to hold the CBO
 downwardly accountable to the villagers is the power granted
 to villagers to elect and remove CBO representatives. While
 this right can be easily exercised in practice, the establishment
 of a supra-village CBO does not promote the empowerment
 of existing village government organs (Shivji 2002; Ribot
 2004; Nelson 2007) and weakens accountability links that
 are already available, because the CBO is spatially further
 detached from the villagers than the village government that
 distance, terrain, means of available transport, and season.
 Burunge villagers are arguably least affected by this, having
 a tarmac road cutting through the region, but for communities
 in more remotely located WMAs this is a serious burden and
 barrier to access their CBO (e.g., Lake Natron, Makame, the
 Y O C u " k p " v j g " U g n q w u / P k c u u c " E q t t k f q t " k p " U q w v j g t p " V c p | c p k c + 0 "
 With the recentralisation of resource management from the
 x k n n c i g " q h L e g " w r " v q " v j g " E D Q . " p g i q v k c v k p u " q x g t " c e e g u u " v q " u q o g "
 of the resources are also recentralised to the CBO level away
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 of villagers also diminishes if people from several villages have
 to lobby the CBO through village representatives instead of
 attending village assemblies where demands can be expressed
 directly to an elected village council.

We conclude that the CBO is upwardly accountable to the
 Wildlife Division, that makes state policy and regulations,
 gives authority to the CBO to manage the WMA, and can take
 this authority away. Given the strong relations of accountability
 d g v y g g p " v j g " E D Q " c p f " v j g " Y k n f n k h g " F k x k u k q p . " E D Q 0 u " f q y p y c t f "
 accountability to the communities is relatively weakened.
 That is to say, it does not matter much who will be elected
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 to do what the villagers like it to do are limited by state
 policy and regulations that give the Director of Wildlife key
 decision-making powers in community-based natural resource
 management. At the same time, the CBO holds the villagers
 accountable to the rules over access, and it can enforce many
 q h " v j g u g " t w n g u " v j t q w i j " h q t e g " q t " L p c p e k c n " u c p e v k q p k p i 0 " J g p e g . "
 WMA villages are trapped into relations of accountability
 v j c v " o c m g " k v " f k h L e w n v " v q " n g x g t c i g " r q n k v k e c n " r q y g t " v q " e j c p i g "
 rules that govern rural livelihoods in their communities. In
 q v j g t " y q t f u . " v j g t g " k u " p q " - d c n c p e g " q h " r q y g t u 0 " * Q { q p q " 4 2 2 6 + "
 to effectively hold community representatives (i.e., CBO
 members) accountable at the village level.

BURUNGE WMA: GOVERNANCE THROUGH COERCION AND LEGAL STRUGGLES

In the following section we review some of the evidence

Park and hosting two tourist lodges, located in Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu, respectively (cf. Figure 2). The Hunting Use Zone spans the villages Kakoi, Vilima Vitatu, Ngolei, Mwada



of the WMA and won a legal case against the CBO and the village government, but efforts to evict the people continue to this day. Farming restrictions on Burunge WMA land in the villages Manyara, Magara, and Maweni are not policed d{"EDQou" xknc i g" i c o g" ueqwvu" hqt" xctkqwu" tgcucpu. "kpenw f kpi" the challenge to patrol wetland areas and contesting claims to land ownership.

EDQou" r q y g t u" v q" e j c p i g" c t t c p i g o g p v u" k p" t g u r q p u g" v q" e q p l k e v u" c t g" q h v g p" e q p u v t c k p g f" d { " j k i j g t" n g x g n u" q h" i q x g t p o g p v." poor understanding of the land laws or simply reluctance to listen to WMA communities.

This is a complicated process. The village would have vq" t g s w g u v" v q" e j c p i g" d q w p f c t k g u" c v" v j g" C w v j q t k u g f" C u u q e k c v k q p"] k 0 g 0. " v j g" E D Q _ . " v j g" C w v j q t k u g f" Association would have to ask the District and the Wildlife Division. Burunge WMA does not accept u w e j" t g s w g u v u. " d g e c w u g" x k n c i g u" y q w n f" m g g r" c u m k p i" for more and more changes. (interview with former member of Burunge CBO, 2015).

J c x k p i" c" e q p u g t x c v k q p" P I Q" c p f" v j g" F k u v t k e v" I c o g" Q h L e g t" as facilitators and watchmen further reduces incentives to listen to demands from below.

" C m v j q w i j" y g" j c x g" x k n c i g" t g r t g u g p v c k x g u"] c v" v j g" E D Q _ . " they are not well educated and not well aware of legal issues, so the District and Wildlife Division impose their own will on WMA. Authorised Association [i.e., v j g" E D Q _ " o g o d g t u" c t g" u q o g v k o g u" v t k e m g f" d { " F k u v t k e v" and other authorities by being taken to seminars and treated nicely. Authorised Association members feel obliged to accept whatever is told them. They forget that they should be representing the villagers. Only few Authorised Association members are strong enough to keep representing the village needs. (interview with member of Olasiti village government, 2014)

Community struggles over access to grazing land

Q p g" q h" D w t w p i g o u" x k n c i g u" w u g f" v q" d g" r c t v" q h" c p q v j g t" x k n c i g" w p v k n" c d q w v" L x g" { g c t u" c i q. " y j g p" k v" u g r c t c v g f" c p f" d g e c o g" independent. The newly created village had to be sensitised d { " v j g" F k u v t k e v" I c o g" Q h L e g t" c p g y" v q" d g" r g t u w c f g f" v q" l q k p" D w t w p i g" Y O C 0" Y k v j" v j g" c v v c k p g f" k p f g r g p f g p e g. " c n n" i t c | k p i" land set aside during the WMA establishment remained with the old village. To complicate matters, the new village is located next to and overlaps with the WMA hunting block, an area that has been traditionally used by livestock keepers h t q o" c f l c e g p v" e q o o w p k v k g u" h q t" f t { " u g c u q p" i t c | k p i 0" k p" 4235." the hunting block has been taken over by a new investor who does not offer any hunting tourism, but uses the concession for non-consumptive (safari) activities throughout the year. Until recently, livestock keepers from the new village believed that the village leadership gave away their land to the WMA, while the leadership sees itself as being lured into accepting the WMA, not being fully informed about the challenges during

the sensitisation process (interview with former member of village government, 2015).

P q v" j c x k p i" g p q w i j" n c p f" h q t" f t { " u g c u q p" d u g

(more than USD 300,000 by the end of 2015, own estimation). As of July 2016, the court has ruled in favour of this village, potentially creating a legal precedent for other WMA villages

security strategies for those who ostensibly become dependent on markets instead of subsistence farming.


'If this is a community project, then who is the community?'


CONCLUSION

Village game scouts have been beaten up by a group of Barabaig residents when a Barabaig woman was apprehended by a WMA village game scout for cutting a tree inside the WMA. During the dry season in 2014, Warusha residents collectively decided to enter the hunting block with their livestock and their spears seeking direct confrontation with the security forces, which led to an injured guard of the hunting block operator. Several legal cases have been pursued by WMA actors and village governments to safeguard the territorial integrity of Burunge WMA against its own residents. Many of the people whom we talked to and who either do not represent them, or are powerless to do what their CBO once they are elected. They stop caring about us, they only think about their stomachs" (Member of Kakoi village government, interview 2014).


With this article we have shown how WMA governance distributes rights to land and resources to different actors and regulates access in a way that villagers feel disempowered to hold their representatives at the CBO to account. We have also argued that the prevalent conservation bias acts as a backdrop to WMA governance, inhibiting genuine participation in decisions over management goals and access to land and resources

We can barely recognise the participating villages when we look at the CBNRM or CBC, rather it seems to us that they follow the framing of a WMA as community-based natural resources and powers in WMA governance. The CBO is positioned to enforce the rules and to withstand pressure from below to modify them, while the central government is supported by the facilitators from the District and NGOs making sure that the rules are following the logic of conservation corridors. Being an area where human and livestock population have been on the rise for years, livelihoods begin to emerge. In Kakoi are increasingly looking for opportunities to rent land. Despite the promise of rural development through WMA captured by the communities to represent viable options for alternative livelihood strategies. Instead, sesame has become a popular cash crop in response to intensifying crop damage by wildlife, which makes the cultivation of corn—a key staple food—a risky endeavour, and has the potential to transform food





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