4 Close appositions

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will deal with a number of very similar binominal expressions, often referred to in the literature as close appositions. The more general category of appositions, which has been the subject of an extensive amount of research, has proved quite difficult to define and, in the course of the debate, has come to include so many different constructions (e.g. Meyer 1992) that it is difficult to conceive of these constructions as constituting one category. In this section we will not, however, be concerned with the question of which constructions should be called appositions and which not, although we agree with, among others, Acuña-Fariña (1996, 1999) that it is only useful to compare and capture under one label constructions which have a fair number of features (morpho-syntactic, semantic and/or pragmatic) in common. Instead, the discussion to follow will be restricted to a small subset of appositional constructions – a subset which is generally referred to as close or restrictive appositions and which consists of a number of binominal constructions which, formally as well as functionally, behave in an apparently unified manner.

Nevertheless, it will the aim of this section to demonstrate that there are, in fact, important syntactic, semantic and pragmatic differences even among these constructions, and that, although it may be justified to capture them all under the general heading of close apposition, we are really dealing with a number of subtypes, given in (1).

(1) a. the actor Orson Welles   Type 1a: $det + N + N_P$
    b. the word recession   Type 1b: $det + N + N$
    c. my friend Orson Welles   Type 2a: $poss + N + N_P$
    d. my friend the actor   Type 2b: $poss + N + det + N$
    e. Orson Welles the actor   Type 3: $N_P + det + N$
    f. actor Orson Welles   Type 4: $N + N_P$

As a preliminary characterization, we can say that all the constructions in (1) have the following formal characteristics:

(i)   They contain two nominal elements;
(ii) There is no linking element between these elements (as opposed to such constructions as *the city of Rome*, *the name of Algernon*);[1]
(iii) One element is a proper noun (Types 1a, 2a, 3 and 4), or some other element which is normally taken to be uniquely denoting (Types 1b and 2b); the other element is a count noun;
(iv) In spoken language the two elements form one intonation unit; in written language the two elements are not separated by a comma.

In addition – although here we prefer to be tentative – the following semantic features are often mentioned:

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[1] For a discussion of constructions of this type, see Chapter 5, Section XX.

(v) Both elements refer to the same entity;

(vi) There is a semantic relation (of modification, predication or specification) between the two elements.

At the end of Section 4.2, we will present a modified and extended version of this preliminary definition, in particular of the feature mentioned in (v). Ultimately, we hope to prove that this modified definition and the analyses it implies are more satisfactory than those proposed so far.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2 we will discuss and compare the criteria for close apposition put forward in previous treatments of this construction. As none of these accounts seem to offer a truly satisfactory account of the notion of close apposition, it will be suggested that instead of regarding close appositions as one homogeneous group (with one basic underlying form), we should distinguish a number of different types. In order to decide how to analyse and represent these various types, we will consider evidence from definiteness and anaphoricity (Section 4.3). On the basis of further morpho-syntactic and semantic evidence, different underlying representations will be proposed for each of these types (Section 4.3.3). Finally, Section 4.4 will discuss the various discourse functions of close appositions. It will be shown that different types of apposition distinguished differ with regard to which of these discourse functions they can perform. Some overall conclusions will be presented in Section 4.5.

Finally, a brief remark on terminology may be required. As will become apparent in the discussion of previous analyses in Section 4.2, a considerable number of different terms have been used to refer to close appositions as a whole and the two component elements. In our own treatment, we will refer to each of the constructions in (1) as (close) appositions, while the two nominal elements will be referred to either as the first element (or N1) and the second element (or N2) (reflecting the order in which the elements occur), or as the proper noun (or uniquely defining element) and the descriptive element.

4.2 Criteria from previous analyses

4.2.1 Introduction

Over the years, constructions of Type 1 (*the poet Burns*, *the word recession*) and to a lesser extent Type 3 (*Burns the poet*), have been given a number of different treatments. Some of these will be discussed in the present section. We will not, however, present and discuss these treatments fully and separately. Instead, we present a list of criteria for close appositions extracted from these earlier works, ordered along a number of important formal and semantic features. The list will not be exhaustive; it will simply serve to introduce the concepts and criteria employed in discussions of close apposition, in preparation for the analysis presented in Section 4.3.4. It will be noted that in some cases the criteria given are contradictory; needless to say that these criteria in particular deserve our full attention.

1. Intonation
a. the stress pattern is secondary-primary (Haugen 1953; cf. Francis 1958: 302);

b. the two elements belong to the same information unit, indicated in speech by inclusion in the same tone unit (Quirk et al. 1972/1985).

2. Form of the elements

a. the two parts must belong to the same major form class (Fries 1952: 187; Hockett 1955: 101; Francis 1958: 301; Sopher 1971; Quirk et al. 1972/1985);

b. instances of close apposition invariably contain a proper name or 'a noun with a similar force, namely, a word or expression representing a thing as an individual, not as a member of a class.' (Curme 1931: 92-93);

c. close appositions contain (i) a modifier consisting of the definite article followed by a nontitular class noun (i.e. which normally requires an article); (ii) a head, which is a substantive expression containing a non-class noun, i.e. proper noun or mass/substance noun (one which can normally occur without an article) (Haugen 1953).

3. Headedness and syntactic omissibility

a. in constructions of the type *the poet Burns* 'the second element is restrictive and is necessary to limit, or restrict, or define the meaning of the first' (Lee 1952; cf. Francis 1958: 301);

b. close appositions of the type *the poet Burns* are modifier-head constructions (Haugen 1953, Burton-Roberts 1975, Acuña-Fariña 1996);

c. the construction must be endocentric, while there must be no more justification for taking the first part as attribute of the second as head than for the reverse (Hockett 1955: 101);

d. on a syntactic level the apposition is neither co-ordinated nor subordinated to the subject: it is not co-ordinated because we cannot insert a conjunction and the verb is in the singular; it is not subordinated since it is structurally independent and can itself function as the subject of the sentence (Sopher 1971);

e. each of the appositives can be separately omitted without affecting the acceptability of the sentence (Quirk et al. 1972/1985; see also (4c)); each part must fulfil the same syntactic function in the resulting sentences (Quirk et al. 1972/1985); in addition they must fulfil the same function as in the original sentence (Burton-Roberts 1975).

4. Reference and semantic omissibility

a. the two parts must refer to the same entity (Haugen 1953: 169; Hockett 1955: 101; Sopher 1971: 27);

b. the two parts must be identical in reference or else the reference of the one must be included in the reference of the other (Quirk et al. 1972/1985);

c. In appositional expressions like *my good friend Ollie North*, there is no real basis for singling out either component as the head ... because their profiles [roughly, type of designation, EK] correspond, and each corresponds to the profile of the composite structure, it is arbitrary to say that the latter inherits its profile from either one of the component structures (Langacker 2002: 28).

d. on a notional level the apposition is neither co-ordinated nor subordinated to the subject: it is no co-ordinated because there is only one referent; it is not subordinated since the two nouns are interchangeable without changing the meaning of the sentence (Sopher 1971);

e. each of the appositives can be separately omitted without affecting the acceptability of the sentence (Quirk et al. 1972; 1985);

f. after omitting either of the two parts there must be no difference between the original sentence and either of the resulting sentences in extralinguistic reference (Burton-Roberts1975).

5. Positions of the elements
a. the apposition is linked to the subject (by being placed alongside of it) (Sopher 1971);
b. the two parts are arbitrarily reversible (Sopher 1971).

In the following sections we will consider each of these points in detail. In doing so we will point at their inadequacies and inconsistencies and will indicate the cause of their shortcomings.

4.2.2 Intonation and form of the elements

4.2.2.1 Intonation

Intonation is probably the least controversial of the properties of close appositions. All linguists agree that the two elements of a close apposition form one intonation unit, and, as such, are not separated by a pause in speaking or a comma in writing. In addition, in the unmarked case secondary stress falls on the first element, with primary stress being given to the second element (cf. adjective-noun constructions). It is true that application of these tests will often be inconclusive, as 'pauses' may be difficult to define, people are notoriously sloppy in the use of commas, and contrastive and emphatic uses will lead to different intonation patterns (see also Section 4.4.4). Nevertheless, these formal features do, on the whole, suffice to indicate the status of the apposition as close/restrictive as opposed to nonrestrictive.

Intonation thus allows us to distinguish between the restrictive constructions in (2) and the non-restrictive constructions in (3). The appositions in examples (2a) and (3a), both taken from the spoken part of the corpus, exhibit completely different intonation patterns. In (2a) the string *the Jaguar boss Tom Walkenshaw* is pronounced as one unit, without a pause before the proper noun. Moreover, primary stress is given to the proper noun only, with secondary stress being attached to N1. In (3a), on the hand, there is a clear pause between the N1 and the name, while (parts of) both elements are given primary stress. In the examples (2b) and (3b), taken from the written part of the corpus, this difference is reflected in the absence or presence of commas.

(2) a. This is a really big home win for Jaguar and indeed for Silverstone because *the Jaguar boss Tom Walkenshaw* is of course the uh managing director of Silverstone Circuits the B R D C <ICE-GB:S2A-012 #90:6:A>
 b. *The historian Pio Cassius* claimed that all the tribes in Scot Caledonia had grouped themselves under either the Maeatae or the Caledonians. <ICE-GB:W1A-009 #108:2>

(3) a. I asked *the conciliation director at the National Family Conciliation Council, Thelma Fisher* <ICE-GB:S2B-019 #101:1:A>
 b. The characterisation of *the heroine, Cindie*, might also have alienated these Party readers <ICE-GB:W2B-009 #53:1>

That not all cases of close apposition conform to these criteria can be seen from the example in (4). The very long descriptive first element and the name Mullet clearly form one intonation unit. The proper noun, however, does not receive primary stress, which may be due to the salience of the information provided in the lengthy first element.

(4)   And medical attention will immediately go out to *the rider who fell there calling the causing the stoppage of that race Mullet* <ICE-GB:S2A-012 #147:7:A>.

The same intonation pattern is found in constructions where the two element occur in the reversed order, as in examples (5) and (6). In (5a), the construction *Humphrey the Cabinet cat* is pronounced as one unit, with primary stress on the second element, while the lack of commas in the written example in (5b) also suggests a restrictive interpretation. Examples (6a&b), on the other hand, are clearly non-restrictive.

(5)   a.   Even *Humphrey the Cabinet cat* seems affected by the imminent change of occupier <ICE GB:S2B-003 #101:1:P>
      b.   But *Moro the loner* was not for sale. <ICE-GB:W2C-010 #29:1>

(6)   a.   Today of course we have Mr Bryan Gould an immigrant from New Zealand and a former Oxford don supported by *Paul Foot the son of a Labour lord the grandson of a Lib-Lab knight* helping to convince us that Britain is not an open society <ICE-GB:S2B-035 #98:2:A>
      b.   Sheilah Graham, the Hollywood columnist, in her book *Scratch an Actor* (1969) says of Steve McQueen: ... <ICE-GB:W2B-010 #196:1>

In the fourth type of appositive construction we are interested in, the construction $N + N_P$, exemplified in (1f), the stress will clearly be on the second part, at least in the unmarked case. Some examples are given in (7), all of which contain an N1 indicating a rank or function and an N2 which takes the form of a proper noun and which receives primary stress.

(7)   a.   *Group Captain David Henderson* the commander of one detachment of Tornado bombers and Jaguar fighters paid tribute to the outstanding electronic support that his pilots had received in their raids on two Iraqi -held airfields <ICE-GB:S2B-008 #38:1:E>
      b.   The final sign that all is clear for the march off to begin will be when *garrison Sergeant-Major Perry Mason of the Coldstream Guards* somebody who is very easy for a commentator to pick out <ICE -GB:S2A-011 #133:1:A>
      c.   *Environment Secretary Michael Heseltine*, charged with overseeing the nuts and bolts of the poll tax review, reflected the official line yesterday, insisting that the review would not be speeded up. <ICE -GB:W2C-018 #22:1>

This type of construction does not seem to have a direct non-restrictive counterpart: it is difficult to read the example in (7) with a comma intonation, giving primary stress to both elements; nor do examples of this kind with a comma between the two parts seem to occur in written texts. As can be seen from the examples in (8), however, non-restrictive constructions are quite common when the two elements occur in reversed order.

(8) a. *Campbell Christie, general secretary of the STUC*, also accused BS of doing everything possible to make sure there was no future for Ravenscraig. <ICE-GB:W2C-015 #14:1>

  b. *JOHN MOORE , Secretary of State for Transport* <ICE-GB:W2B-016 #5:1>

4.2.2.2 Form of the elements

In order for a structure to qualify as a close apposition, it is generally agreed that its two elements must belong to the same major form class, i.e. the class of nouns (e.g. Hockett 1955, Francis 1958, Sopher 1971). Note that this class includes common nouns (count or mass) as well as proper nouns. Quirk et al. (1972/1985), too, use syntactic class to distinguish between what they call 'strict' and 'weak' apposition: in strict appositions the two elements are of the same syntactic class, in weak appositions they are not. In their case, however, the syntactic class of the elements is not so much the N as the NP. What this shows is that although there is overall consensus on the fact that the two elements somehow have to belong to the same class, the exact form or status of this class depends on the analysis given to such structures (e.g. as consisting of two nouns or two NPs).

A similar situation arises when the two elements are further characterized as count, mass or proper nouns. From the examples given so far it will have become clear that one of the characteristics of close appositions is that they contain, as Curme (1931: 92) puts it, 'a proper noun [or] noun with a similar force, namely a word or expression representing a thing as an individual, not as a member of a class: *the letter a*, *the figure 5*, *the verb go*, *the preposition in ...*'. Haugen (1953: 168-169) adds to this that, instead of a proper noun, a mass or substance noun can also be used, the distinguishing feature between the two elements of a close apposition being that the second element usually occurs without an article in other contexts, while the first element must have an article in other contexts. In other words, no class noun (count noun) can occur as what he perceives of as the head of the construction (typically N2; for a discussion of headedness, see Section 4.2.3). Thus the examples in (9) are acceptable as appositions, since the names *Turandot* and *PAIN*, and the substance noun *seroglycerin* are normally not preceded by a definite article; examples like the one in (10), on the other hand, do not occur, since these constructions combine two class nouns.

(9) a. This story appears to be the origin of *the opera Turandot* <ICE-GB:S2A-059 #82:1:A>

  b. Our next witness is Sue Amphlett who in nineteen eighty-five set up *the support group PAIN* which stands for Parents Against Injustice <ICE-GB:S1B-030 #104:1:A>

  c. Incidentally at the time I published the thyroxin essay Burt and Galloway in the States published a similar procedure exactly identical for the measurement of *the insulin seroglycerin* using an antibody as the binding agent <ICE-GB:S2A-042 #91:1:A>

(10) a. *the weapon sword

  b. *the vehicle wagon

In the large majority of cases this prediction turns out to be correct, but, not surprisingly perhaps, there are exceptions. One seemingly trivial counterexample is that of constructions containing the names of ships, rivers etc., which, although

functioning as proper nouns, do require a definite article in other contexts. Of course, one could claim that the definite article here is part of the proper noun; in that case, however, one would expect the article also to turn up in appositional constructions, which, as shown in the examples in (11), is not the case.

(11) a. The position of *the World War Two battleship Missouri* has not been disclosed ... <ICE-GB:S2B-001 #33:1:B>
      b. He said there were no plans to stop submarines operating off the west coast of Scotland where *the fishing boat Antares* went down near the Isle of Arran yesterday morning <ICE-GB:S2B-011 #92:1:A>
      c. This marvel of architecture was built from blocks of stone each weighing man y tons and hoisted a hundred and fifty feet above *the river Gardogne* <ICE-GB:S2B-027 #13:1:A>
      d. Followed by four detachments of the Royal Navy the ships that went to the Gulf *the destroyers Cardiff and Gloucester York the frigates Brazen, Battleaxe, and London* and the mine hunters as well and the ships not yet here but still at sea. <ICE-GB:S2A-019 #57:1:A>

Moreover, there seem to be cases where the second elements may take the form of a definite NP headed by a count noun, as shown in example (12), which seems to qualify as a close apposition on all other points. Obviously, the example in question consists of a highly formulaic type of address, which is indeed very restricted in use. Nevertheless, neither part of this construction is a proper noun, as shown by the fact that both parts can quite easily be combined with a proper noun to form a typical close apposition construction (examples (12a'&a'')).

(12) a. Mr Deputy Speaker I spoke with the chairman of this Select Committee *the honourable gentleman the member for Newnham South* <ICE-GB:S1B-054 #10:1:B>
      a′. the honourable gentleman Mr Thomas Brown
      a″. the member for Newnham South Mr Thomas Brown

A more serious ground for contention is presumably Haugen's (1953) claim that the common noun must contain the definite article. Interestingly, Haugen is the only one to confine the category of close appositions to constructions with the definite article, the more general assumption being that appositions of this kind must be definite, but may contain some other definite determiner. Thus, Burton-Roberts (1975) also discusses constructions with a possessive pronoun (*his friend John*), which he analyses in the same way as constructions with the definite article. Similarly, Quirk at al. (e.g. 1985: 1316ff.) mention the possibility of a possessive or demonstrative determiner, as in *your brother George* and *that famous critic Paul Jones*, while Acuña-Fariña (1996) includes constructions with a possessive pronoun in his discussion of close appositions, assigning them, however, a different structure from those with the definite article (see Section 4.3.1.3).

When we look at the corpus we find that examples with a possessive determiner abound, while occasionally examples with a demonstrative can be found. In addition, the use of a genitive construction turns out to be quite common. Some examples are given in (13)-(15).

(13) a. Well that's like *your friend Ruth* who lives with someone <ICE-GB:S1A-019 #361:1:A>
   b. In fact *my mate at work Anne* was in Scotland about a couple of months ago and she was just talking about uhm with some friend of hers about London and it was the first place they said they went to <ICE-GB:S1A-098 #196:2:B>
   c. In *your book Traditional Alternatives*, you say that since the early nineteen eighties a series of tensions have been evident throughout the Jewish world … <ICE-GB:S1B-047 #78:1:A>
   e. An early chance for us to hear from *our guest tonight Duncan MacKenzie* <ICE-GB:S2A-003 #38:1:A>
   f. And this might well be the plan for Indurain today to put away *his teammate Jean François Bernard* <ICE-GB:S2A-016 #18:1:A>

(14) a. We had a lecture by *that guy Rene Weis over there* <ICE-GB:S1A-006 #20:1:B>
   b. *This fellow Mortmann* was was really was quite heavily influenced by twentieth century <ICE-GB:S1A-053 #177:1:A>
   c. A lot of pressure on *that lad Lyons* <ICE-GB:S2A-004 #1:1:A>
   d. *This child Claire* has no idea what a sprit is <ICE-GB:S2A-030 #37:1:A>
   e. If you have two methodologies in any area of science when you have a response and a quotes dose that means a concentration or amount of a substance and you have a methodology A which gives you that dose response curve shown here and *that methodology B* which gives you that dose response curve in many <ICE-GB:S2A-042 #114:1:A>

(15) a. Claudio Chiapucci outsprinting Andy Hampston with *Hampston's teammate Dag Otto Loretson* in third place <ICE-GB:S2A-016 #11:1:A>
   b. this was used as a pretext by *Mohammed Ali's successor Abaz Pasha* , to retire him on quarter pay from all active service <ICE-GB:S2A-026 #31:1:A>
   c. During the leadership campaign ITN will profile *Mr Hurd's wife Judy* and *Mr Major's wife Norma* <ICE-GB:S2B-003 #123:1:I>
   d. It was *Britain's ambassador Sir David Hannay* who took on the thankless job of explaining why Washington and London would have nothing to do with the proposal from Paris <ICE-GB:S2B-010 #42:1:B>
   e. *The BBC's diplomatic correspondent Paul Reynolds* considers the political and military ramifications of such action <ICE-GB:S2B-015 #26:1:A>

If we accept that the descriptive element of a close apposition may contain other definite determiners apart from the definite article, the next question which arises is whether it is justified to require that the determiner in close appositions be definite. In other words, why not also include in the category such constructions as given in example (16), which contain an indefinite article, but which seem similar to their definite counterparts in all other respects.

(16) a. I have *a friend John who's in Linguistics with me* <ICE-GB:S1A-032 #294:2:B>
      b. So is it clear to everyone that we've got *a constituent on the mat* in each case, because if that 's not clear speak beca use otherwise it 'll be a disaster <ICE-GB:S1B-002 #181:1:A>
      c. And supposing I take *a value K*, and I want to know if F X affects that value<ICE-GB:S1B-013 #128:1:A>
      d. The next trick was to put into each of these die -holes uhm the currents which are down at the bottom there I one I two and I three which were currents at *a radio frequency omega* modulated at *a modulation frequency* P <ICE-GB:S2A-041 #100:1:A>
      e. If you have two methodologies in any area of science when you have a response and a quotes dose that means a concentration or amount of a substance and you have *a methodology A* which gives you that dose response curve shown here and that methodology B which gives you that dose response curve in many <ICE -GB:S2A-042 #114:1:A>

The same would apply to constructions containing the demonstrative determiner *this* in its the indefinite (introductory) use, as illustrated in (17).

(17)   Oh I remember I was talking to *this bloke Mark* some sort of ... this really old friend of mine <ICE-GB:S1A-015 #250:1:B>

Naturally, it is possible to reserve the term close apposition for definite constructions only, or even to those with a definite article. However, apart from the fact that an important generalization seems to be missed, such an approach would leave a very similar group of indefinite constructions unaccounted for.[2]

Finally, it will be clear that by requiring the presence of the definite article, our fourth type of construction, *actor Orson Welles*, would also fall outside the class of close appositions. Although it is true that these constructions are more limited in use then the other types (with N1 basically restricted to titles, the designation of certain professions and certain forms of descriptive element), this does not seem sufficient ground for regarding them as a different category of constructions.

4.2.3 Headedness and syntactic omissibility

Haugen (1953) is very clear on the issue of headedness. He disagrees with Lee's (1952) acceptance of the textbook definition of constructions of the type *the poet Burns* as constructions in which 'the second element is restrictive and is necessary to limit, or restrict, or define the meaning of the first'. According to Haugen, the opposite is obviously true. As a test, he proposes replacement by zero (or omissibility), arguing that the relative function of any two linguistic elements can be determined by omitting each one of them in turn and seeing which one of them can stand alone.

In such constructions as *the poet Burns* it is not possible, Haugen (ibid.: 165-166) claims, for the proper noun to be replaced by zero, as the element *the poet* cannot be used in the same context, e.g. to start a discourse by talking about a poet the hearer may be assumed never to have heard of; this being irreconcilable with the use of the

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[2] All this assuming that the indefinite constructions in (16) are, in fact, similar in their syntactic, semantic and pragmatic behaviour to their definite counterparts. As shown in the remainder of this section, as well as in Section 4.3.1, this does indeed seem to be the case.

definite article. If, on the other hand, we omit *the poet*, Haugen (ibid.: 166) continues, we have 'a perfectly satisfactory sentence'. Haugen concludes that rather than the first noun, it must be the second noun which functions as the head of the construction, as 'in every case "the thing we are talking about" is not the larger class named first, but the individual named last, and the class is added to identify the individual.' (ibid.).

Haugen's account, however, raises more questions than it answers. First of all, a further specification is needed of what is meant by a 'perfectly satisfactory sentence'. From a syntactic point of view, omission of either element leads to an acceptable result. Semantically, too, the resulting construction seems to be 'perfectly satisfactory', no matter which element is being omitted. Nevertheless, Haugen is right in recognizing that omission of the first element may lead to a difference in acceptability. What Haugen has in mind, therefore, is pragmatic acceptability, or felicitousness, of the resulting construction (see also Sections 4.2.4 and 4.4).

Secondly, there is the question of what exactly is meant by 'identification'. As pointed out by Haugen, a construction like *the poet Burns* can be used to start a discourse, even if the hearer cannot be assumed to know the poet in question. Similarly, use of the phrase *the architect Frank Lloyd Wright* would, according to Haugen (1953: 169), merely imply that the speaker does not expect the hearer to know offhand who Frank Lloyd Wright was; if he did, he would not add the modifying epithet. This is, indeed, a special form of identification, one which treats a proper noun as 'uniquely' describing a particular person, while at the same time requiring further identification by means of a preceding modifier. This particular form of identification, which indeed characterizes this type of apposition, we will later refer to as 'descriptively identifying' (following Declerck 1988; see Section 4.4).

In sum, Haugen's use of the replacement-by-zero test to determine headedness within close appositions fails to prove his point because he does not specify the level at which the resulting sentences are to be judged as acceptable. Sopher (1971) is more explicit in this respect, claiming that 'on a syntactic level' the apposition (N2) is not subordinated to the subject (N1) 'since it is structurally independent and can itself function as the subject of the sentence'. Being predominantly concerned with non-restrictive appositions, Sopher's account does not, however, answer the question of what determines headedness in close appositions (i.e. what, apart from word order, determines which element is the 'subject' and which the 'apposition').

Similarly inconclusive is Hockett's (1955) treatment of headedness in close appositions. He agrees with the Haugen's account, except that to Hockett it seems inappropriate to speak of modifier and head when dealing with apposition. The alternative he offers, however, is not altogether convincing. He concedes that in most endocentric constructions the evidence points either to interpreting A as attribute and B as head, or to interpreting A as head an B as attribute. There are, however, cases, according to Hockett (1955: 101), where there 'is cogent evidence for both of these attributive alternatives. When we find this to be the case, we speak of "apposition".'

Apart from the fact that Hockett does not actually specify any evidence to support this claim, there is something distinctly odd about two NPs being mutually attributive. Moreover, as pointed out by Burton-Roberts (1975: 393), it is difficult to see how such a structure can be derived in any explicit linguistic theory. Burton-Roberts himself therefore proposes to analyse these close appositions as modifier-head constructions, in which a proper noun is being modified by an adjectival noun (see also Acuña-Fariña 1996). What he offers is a transformational account, according to which *the poet Burns* is derived from an underlying structure *Burns Burns the poet* in the following way:

(18)   a.   [det] Burns [det] Burns be poet $\Rightarrow$
          b.   [det] Burns WH be poet (relativization, obl) $\Rightarrow$
          c.   the Burns who is a poet $\Rightarrow$
          d.   the Burns poet (relative reduction, opt) $\Rightarrow$
          e.   the poet Burns (by attribute preposing, obl)

Obviously, in an analysis of this kind, Haugen's replacement-by-zero test to establish which of the two elements is the head does not apply, as nowhere in the derivation do the determiner and the first nominal (*the + poet*) form one constituent. In other words, whether or not a sentence is acceptable, syntactically speaking, after the proper noun has been left out is irrelevant: it may be acceptable, but the structure of the construction will have changed, with the determiner and the element *poet* appearing in a new configuration.

Like the others, however, Burton-Roberts does not provide much syntactic evidence for determining headedness. The justification Burton-Roberts gives is all based on the assumption that appositions like *the poet Burns* are derived from constructions containing a relative clause (as in (18c), where the element *Burns*, being a proper noun, is indeed unlikely to act as the predicate).

Acuña-Fariña (1996: 28ff.), adopting Burton-Roberts's analysis of constructions like *the poet Burns*, does try to substantiate the claim that these constructions are modifier-head constructions in which the definite article has scope over both modifier and head. First of all, Acuña-Fariña argues that, since it is the proper noun which imposes restrictions on the elements with which it occurs in a close apposition construction, the proper noun must be the head. Thus, according to Acuña-Fariña (1996: 28), the examples in (19) show that proper nouns in English impose conditions on the kind of elements they may occur with:

(19)   a.   Burns
          b.   this Burns
          c.   *the Burns
          d.   *poet Burns[3]
          e.   the poet Burns
          f.   the excellent Burns
          g.   the Burns who came here yesterday

On the basis of these examples Acuña-Fariña concludes that proper nouns can co-occur only with two other elements (a determiner and a modifier, as illustrated in (19e-g)), except where the construction is deictic (example (19b)). Moreover, the determiner in question is invariably the definite article. According to Acuña-Fariña, this is to be expected: since proper nouns denote unique referents, it is natural that their expansions can only be definite. This, he continues, is confirmed by the fact that proper nouns can never be used in combination with the indefinite article:

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[3] Note, however, the following examples:

(ia)   *Poet Gavin Ewart* said: 'In the old days the Poet Laureate did write for royal weddings and birthdays and they were usually set to music'. <ICE-GB:W2C-020 #96:5>
(ib)   *British explorer Sir Ranulph Fiennes* reached both Poles with support in a transglobe expedition of nineteen eighty-one <ICE-GB:S2B-024 #8:1:A>
(ic)   The staging by Francisco Negrin and *designer Anthony Baker* wittily plays off the opera house and its conventions finally allowing us to glimpse a three tier gilt and scarlet plush auditorium into which the cast make <ICE-GB:S1B-044 #2:1:A>

(20) a. Burns
b. *a Burns
c. *poets Burns
d. *a poet Burns
e. *an excellent Burns
f. *a Burns who came here yesterday

On the basis of this evidence, Acuña-Fariña concludes that it must be the proper noun which functions as the head of the construction, as it is this element which imposes restrictions on the kind of determiners and modifiers with which it can co-occur.

However, Acuña-Fariña's argument here seems to be somewhat flawed. Thus it is true that on their prototypical, referring use, proper nouns denote unique entities (within the discourse context). Moreover, on this use, they may be seen as inherently definite, which accounts for the unacceptability of (19c). If, on the other hand, the proper noun itself cannot be assumed to refer uniquely, it is possible to add modifiers to enable the hearer to identify the entity referred to. If, on the basis of this extra information, the speaker assumes the hearer to be able to (uniquely) identify the referent, the definite article is used to communicate this assumption. Examples are (19e), and, on a contrastive reading, examples (19f&g).

If, on the other hand, the additional information cannot be assumed to guide the hearer to the identity of the referent (either because the description is not uniquely denoting or because a new, unfamiliar referent or name is introduced), the indefinite article is used, resulting in such constructions as (20b), (20d-f), and, in a slightly modified form, example (20c), which, contrary to Acuña-Fariña's claim, are acceptable, and not necessarily more marked than their definite counterparts. Some examples of unmodified indefinite constructions with a proper noun head are given in (21): in (21a&b) the indefiniteness is due to a lack of unique reference; in (21c&d) to the hearer's assumed unfamiliarity with the referent or the name. Examples of constructions containing a modified proper noun can be found in (22); some examples of indefinite close appositions can be found in (23).

(21) a. When *a Fors*yte was engaged, married, or born, the Forsytes were present; when *a Forsyte* died – but *no Forsyte* had as yet died; they did not die; death being contrary to their principles ... (John Galsworthy, *The man of property*)
b. Every now and then *a Forsyte* would come up, sidle round, and take a good look at him. (ibid.)
c. And uh after research by her solicitors, she consulted *a Mr Patrick James*, who apparently is a world authority on this type of surgery <ICE-GB:S2A-062 #73:1:A>
d. the issued share capital being about four four hundred and fifty thousand pounds was shown in another document to be predominantly uh Mr Hook and his wife with minor minor share interests being held by Mr Hunt who was the uh F inance Director of the group and *a Mr Neiman* who was a business associate who'd also been involved in the growth of the Group <ICE-GB:S2A-070 #4:1:A>
e. Do you know *an Alice* <ICE-GB:S1B-026 #18:1:B>
d. Have you got *an Uncle Victor* <ICE-GB:S1B-026 #30:1:A>
f. Lunch was served in the restaurant downstairs by the proprietor himself - *a Monsieur Savlon*, whom we'd met briefly when we arrived. <ICE-GB:W2F-013 #47:1>

(22) a. By 1918, Croatia's political class yearned for *a Yugoslavia where an extended Serbia would have been balanced by a consolidated Croatia*. <ICE-GB:W2B-007 #42:1>

b. Mr Speaker does the Prime Minister realise that if she faced *a Labour Party which was not equally divided equally muddled equally confused on this matter* she would today face a motion of no confidence in her failure at this historic moment <ICE-GB:S1B-053 #25:1:D>

c. *An embarrassed Sir Patrick Mayhew*, QC, the Attorney-General , who was to chair the meeting as head of the Bar, had to cancel it after only 48 of the 6,000 practising barristers in England and Wales arrived at the Camden Centre in north London. <ICE-GB:W2C-006 #27:2>

(23) a. the Prime Minister Mr John Major the Senior Secretary of State for Scotland Ian Lang, Tom King the Secretary of Defence, *military chiefs General Sir Peter de la Billière, Sir David Craig* <ICE-GB:S2A-020 #123:2:A>

b. He also has to put up with *a soppy elder brother Robert* who is forever mooning about some girl or other and *a sister Ethel* who has all the brisk no-nonsense superiority of a true Wodehouse gel <ICE-GB:S2B-026 #14:1:A>

c. I have *a friend John who's in Linguistics with me* <ICE-GB:S1A-032 #294:2:B>

What is equally interesting, however, is that examples (19e&f) also have a non-contrastive reading. The adjective *excellent* in (19f), for instance, may be used contrastively (*the excellent Burns* vs. *the unremarkable Burns*), but this is, in fact, a rather implausible reading. It is much more likely that the adjective is used non-restrictively: there is only one Burns, to whom the property 'excellent' applies (compare example (22c)). In this respect, this construction can be compared to such noun phrases as *the friendly staff*, which, depending on the context, may receive a contrastive (or restrictive) reading (e.g. as opposed to *the unfriendly staff*), but which may also be used to refer to all members of the staff (*the staff, who are friendly*...). On both readings, however, the element *Burns* in the construction *the excellent Burns* functions as a common noun and does not in itself refer. The same can be said about *the poet Burns*, which also allows for both readings (for more details, see Section 4.4); on both readings, neither the element *poet* nor the proper noun *Burns* is used referentially – it is only the construction as a whole which can be said to refer.

Finally, there are plenty of instances where a proper noun co-occurs with a non-restrictive modifying adjective only. Again, the proper noun itself would have been enough to allow the addressee to pick out the intended referent, which, moreover, tends to be given, or at least inferrable, in the disourse context. Examples are given in (24):

(24) a. *Shocked Tony Blair* blasted the murder as "wicked in the extreme." (*The Sun*, 15 Jan 2003, front page)

b. And David O'Leary will float the free kick forward towards *big Allan Smith* <ICE-GB:S2A-015 #104:1:A>

c. *Clever Keith*, finger right on the spot as usual. <ICE-GB:W2F-003 #98:1>

d. How are you keeping yourself back in *sunny Paris* where the food is good? <ICE-GB:W1B-008 #163:6>

e. Other countries of which he seems especially fond include less prominent ones like Vietnam and *tiny Bhutan* ... <ICE-GB:W2B-011 #65:1>

We may therefore conclude that the examples provided by Acuña-Fariña (i.e. examples (19) and (20)) fail to reflect actual language use and as such cannot be used as a basis for determining which element functions as the head of the construction.

Acuña-Fariña then goes on to show that the definite determiner and the element *poet* in the construction *the poet Burns* do not form a constituent. As evidence he uses the examples in (25), which he considers ungrammatical, to show that in these constructions 'the common noun cannot reach its maximal expansion in this environment', as it cannot be modified by restrictive PPs or relative clauses:

(25)   a.   *the author of "Go down Moses" William Faulkner
        b.   *the poet of the decade Burns
        c.   *the poet distinguished by the critics Burns
        d.   *the poet who supported the revolution Burns

Again, however, Acuña-Fariña's observations here prove incorrect. As it turns out, the first element in these constructions can be modified, by PPs as well as by relative clauses, as shown in example (26).

(26)   a.   Uhm let me bring in *the Conservative leader of the county council Ken Thompson* <ICE-GB:S1B-034 #3:1:A
        b.   *The most influential writer on the English constitution Walter Bagehot* warned that daylight should not be let in on the magic of the monarchy if its prestige is to
        c.   And medical attention will immediately go out to *the rider who fell there calling the causing the stoppage of that race Mullet* <ICE-GB:S2A-012 #147:7:A> (= example (4))

This is not to say that the definite article and the first noun must form a constituent; all these examples show is that the first nominal element can be modified. This, however, cannot be taken as evidence for or against the status of this element as the head of the construction.

What Acuña-Fariña's discussion does make clear, however, is that it is difficult to find convincing (syntactic or semantic) evidence to determine headedness in close appositions. We will return to this issue in Section 4.3.3, where a number of additional tests will be proposed.

4.2.4 Reference and semantic omissibility

In most accounts of close apposition (e.g. Haugen 1953: 169; Hockett 1955: 101; Sopher 1971: 27; see also Quirk et al. 1972, 1985), the two parts of the construction are taken to refer to one and the same entity; which is why, according to these accounts, on a semantic level either part can be left out. Burton-Roberts (1975: 396, 1994), on the other hand, claims that close appositions do not contain two referential parts, since, in his view, it is a 'logical impossibility' for two coreferential constituents to form a higher NP, especially where this higher NP is supposed to be coreferential with both these elements. He uses the examples in (27) to show that two truly referential elements cannot form one constituent. According to Burton-Roberts (1975: 396), these constructions are unacceptable 'precisely because their immediate constructions have identical implications of reference'.

(27) a. *_The author of 'Ulysses' Joyce_ is buried in Zurich.
      b. *_His favourite playwright Osborne_ is being performed tonight.
      c. *Linguistics the study of language
      d. *The Bard Shakespeare

According to Acuña-Fariña (1996: 34ff.), this also accounts for the ungrammaticality of the expressions in (28a-d):

(28) a. *the poet of the decade Burns (= (25b))
      b. *the poet distinguished by the critics Burns (= (25c))
      c. *the poet who supported the revolution Burns (= (25d))
      d. *the poet that is famous Burns
      e. *?the tall poet Burns[4]
      f. the famous poet Burns

The reason that (28a-d) are ungrammatical, Acuña-Fariña (1996: 36) argues, is that 'the heavier the modification of the noun ... the easier for the article to cease referring forward across the common noun to the proper noun, in order to refer to the common noun and its modifiers instead'. In other words, the heavier the modifying first unit, the more likely it is for the determiner and this unit to be reinterpreted as a noun phrase. In other words, Acuña-Fariña concludes, 'it is the grammatical weight of the nominal in N1 that causes coreference, through its referential "saturation".'

The difference in acceptability between (28e-f) is accounted for along similar lines. When in constructions of this type an adjective like _tall_ precedes the first noun, the sequence _tall + poet_ again triggers a reinterpretation of the structure in which the definite article has scope only over the first unit. As can be seen from example (28f), not all adjectives trigger such a reinterpretation. According to Acuña-Fariña (1996: 37), however, the set of adjectives which can be used in these constructions constitute only a very small set, including _famous_, _magnificent_, _excellent_ and _ingenious_, which have in common that they can also modify proper nouns under other circumstances (e.g. _the famous Burns_). The fact that these adjectives modify the proper noun blocks the reinterpretation of the first unit as a (referential) NP. This, Acuña-Fariña concludes, supports the analysis proposed, in which the first unit functions as a modifier of the proper noun.

As pointed out before (see discussion of example (25) above), however, constructions like the ones given in (28) may, in fact, be perfectly acceptable and are relatively common in spoken language. Consider in this respect also the examples in (29), where the appositions consist of what will normally be considered two uniquely referring expressions (a demonstrative or possessive phrase and a proper noun); nevertheless, each of these constructions is perfectly acceptable as a close apposition (for a discussion of close appositions containing a possessive pronoun, see also examples (44)-(45) below).

(29) a. We had a lecture by _that guy Rene Weis over there_ <ICE-GB:S1A-006 #20:1:B>
      b. I don't really know how to proceed; how to regard our future relationship, and depending on what that relationship is, whether _that great invention the Channel_

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[4] According to Acuña-Fariña (1996: 37), 'we do not have, at least naturally, the tall poet Burns because we do not have the tall Burns'. Note, however, that there is nothing unnatural about the combination of the adjective tall and a proper noun:

(i)   Behind him his cousin, _the tall George_, the son of the fifth Forsyte, Roger, had a Quilpish look on his fleshy face ... (John Galsworthy, _The man of property_)

will come between us, emotionally not just physically. <ICE-GB:W1B-008 #131:4>

    c.   *This fellow Mortmann* was was really was quite heavily influenced by twentieth century <ICE-GB:S1A-053 #177:1:A>

    d.   Mr Nock and *his wife Kath* have two other children, *David's twin sister Sally*, who is still at school, and elder brother, Robert, a student in London. <ICE-GB:W2C-020 #88:4>

Acuña-Fariña's second claim, that constructions like (28e-f) are only grammatical if the adjective used can also modify the proper noun in other environments, also proves to be incorrect. Thus, a brief consultation of our corpus shows that all kinds of adjectives can be used in this position. Some examples are given in (30)-(32).

(30)   a.   Steve Cram, in the famous yellow vest has gone in behind *the early leader Mark Kirk* here in this heat of the fifteen hundred metres <ICE-GB:S2A-007 #141:13:A>

    b.   *The former American president Ronald Reagan* and his wife Nancy were ready to offer advice on retirement <ICE-GB:S2B-003 #114:1:P>

    c.   And the deficiency seems to be greatest at the top - in *the Irish Prime Minister Charles James Haughey himself*. <ICE-GB:W2E-009 #8:1>

    d.   The coalition forces have continued their sorties on *the Iraqi capital Baghdad* <ICE-GB:S2B-015 #43:1:A>

    e.   Far from being cold-hearted *the great eighteenth century rationalist republican Thomas Paine* who's been called the greatest Englishman got himself sentenced to the guillotine because he argued passionately in the assembly of the French Revolutionary Council for the life of King Louis <ICE-GB:S2B-032 #15:1:A>

    f.   *The most influential writer on the English constitution Walter Bagehot* warned that daylight should not be let in on the magic of the monarchy if its prestige is to be preserved <ICE-GB:S2B-032 #55:1:A>

    g.   In particular they want *the senior Japanese officer George Takai* to be acquitted because the game plan is to appoint him along with other survivors of the Nipponese nobility to run post-war Japan as a puppet state under U S control <ICE-GB:S2B-033 #49:1:A>

(31)   a.   In the 17th century, *the German carpenter Staedtler* used sulphur and antimony to bind crushed graphite into usable sticks. <ICE-GB:W2D-016 #14:1>

    b.   According to *the Greek historian Zosimus* (who wrote at the end of the sixth century) 'The Britons took up arms and fighting for themselves, freed the cities from the barbarian pressure, expelling the Roman officials and setting up their own administration as well as they could'. <ICE-GB:W1A-001 #18:1>

    c.   The first breakthrough was the discovery that light falling on *the chemical element selenium* made its resistance change. <ICE-GB:W2B-034 #13:1>

    d.   for example, *the multi-national corporation Unilever* had palm oil plantations in Nigeria <ICE-GB:W1A-015 #11:1>

(32) a. And again it's *the little man Alfero Moreno* who's got it <ICE-GB:S2A-010 #153:1:A>

b. Uhm gallate an effective anti-oxidant in the food industry is produced on multi-term quantities and also *the synthetic sweetener aspartine* is produced using uh esters

c. Unlike *the bottlenosed dolphin Tursiops truncatus*, which is the commonest Gulf species, the humpback has a long, thin snout, often tipped white. <ICE-GB:W2B-029 #111:1>

d. The impedance of the earpiece used in the prototype was rather more than 100Ω, so *the common emitter BC327* is quite capable of handling the drive current and produces a respectably high volume with a truly authentic ringer sound. <ICE-GB:W2B-032 #56:1>

e. these receptors show high affinity for CCK and at least 1000-fold lower affinity for *the related peptide gastrin*. <ICE-GB:W2A-027 #46:1>

In the examples in (30), the adjective can only be interpreted as modifying the first noun; without this noun, the construction will be semantically anomalous. In (31), leaving out the first noun yields an acceptable construction, but only if the adjective preceding this noun is reinterpreted as a noun, the result being yet another apposition (e.g. *the German Staedtler*, *the chemical selenium*, *the multi-national Unilever*). In (32), the adjective may be regarded as modifying either the first noun or the proper noun (although the latter is certainly not always the most plausible option). In other words, not only is it perfectly acceptable for an adjective in this position to modify the first noun rather than the proper noun, in addition the group of adjectives allowed in this position turns out to be much larger than suggested by Acuña-Fariña.

The point is that the examples in (27) and (28a-d) do not, in fact, provide evidence for the view that it is impossible for two coreferential constituents to form one NP. Since almost any element, even proper nouns and unique descriptions, can be used attributively, these examples do not prove that the appositions here cannot consist of two coreferential elements; on the assumption that, indeed, these constructions do not combine two referential parts, what needs to be accounted for is why certain descriptions (e.g. *the author of 'Ulysses'*) are not likely to occur in close appositions. We will return to this matter in Section 4.4.2.

If we adopt the view that close appositions do not consist of two coreferential elements, the argument of 'semantic omissibility' becomes, of course, irrelevant. That the resulting sentences are, as a rule, semantically acceptable merely shows that both elements can be used to refer to the same entity as the appositions of which they form part. This is hardly surprising: in the apposition they are both used to denote attributes of the same entity; being nominal, both elements can therefore be used to form an NP referring to that entity (cf. Acuña-Fariña 1996: 30).

However, as we have seen before, even if omission of one of the elements leads to a syntactically and semantically acceptable sentence, this does not mean that the resulting construction is always acceptable in the given context. Let us briefly return to Haugen's (1953) claim that if, in the case of *the poet Burns*, we leave out the proper noun, the resulting construction can no longer felicitously be used to start a discourse. This, of course, is correct.[5] Haugen continues, however, that if we omit *the poet*, we have 'a perfectly satisfactory sentence, though to be sure we would like to have the additional piece of information that it is the poet by that name we are talking

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[5] Observe, however, that this is not equally true of all appositions. Thus in the case of an expression like *my husband Mark* the proper name can be left out even if the referent has not been introduced and the hearer does not know (of the existence of) the referent.

about' (Haugen 1953: 166). By adding this caveat, however, Haugen admits that – in the same context – the resulting construction is not 'perfectly satisfactory', since full identification of the person referred to depends on the presence of the epithet *the poet*. In other words, omission of either of the two elements may be semantically and syntactically acceptable, but may result in a pragmatically unacceptable construction. It may be the case that the speaker may be less cooperative (in the sense of Grice 1975) if s/he leaves out the proper noun, but even if it is the descriptive element that is omitted the speaker is less specific than Grice's Cooperative Principle would require.

In Section 4.4 we will discuss in more detail the matter of pragmatic omissibility, a notion which in our view plays a crucial part in a thorough understanding both of the different uses of appositions and the circumstances in which either of the elements can be left out.

4.2.5 Order of the elements

Each of the existing treatments of close appositions includes the claim that the two elements in a close apposition can be arbitrarily reversed. As in the case of omissibility, the resulting constructions are acceptable from a syntactic and semantic point of view; once again, this does not mean that they must have the same internal structure or discourse function. We only need to we go back once more to Haugen's example of the construction *the poet Burns* and the possibility of using it at the beginning of a discourse, to see that the order of the two elements cannot be arbitrarily reversed: as illustrated in example (33), it may make quite a difference whether we use *the poet Burns* or *Burns the poet*.

(33) a. The poet Burns was born in 1759.
      b. ≠Burns the poet was born in 1759.

We will return to this difference in Section 4.4, where we will explain why the order in (33b) is more restricted in its use than that in (33a).

Finally, it may be worthwhile to point out that reversing the order of the two elements of a close apposition does not always yield a syntactically acceptable construction. As pointed out by Burton-Roberts (1975: 403-404), it is possible for a plural first element to precede a singular proper noun (example (34a)). As shown in (34b), reversing the order results in an ungrammatical construction.

(34) a. the biologists Huxley
      b. *Huxley the biologists

4.2.6 Conclusion: modified definition and preliminary analysis

On the basis of the preceding discussion we can now be somewhat more specific in our characterization of close appositions. Instead of the preliminary definition provided in the introduction we can now say that each of the types of close apposition has the following properties:

Formal properties
(i) they contain two nominal elements;
(ii) these elements form one intonation unit.
(iii) there is no linking element between the elements (as opposed to such constructions as *the city of Rome*, *the name of Algernon*);
(iv) one element is a proper noun or uniquely defining element, the other a count noun (does not apply to Type 2b).

Semantic criteria
(i) neither element within the construction is referential; both elements can, however, be used independently to refer to the same entity (although to do so may not be felicitous in the given context);
(ii) the semantic relation between the two elements is one of modification.

At the basis of this modified characterization lies the assumption that it is only the apposition as a whole that is referential, with each of the elements fulfilling a predicative function. As a result, the definite article (or more generally, the determiner) in constructions of the type $det + N + N_P$ will be seen as having scope not only over the first element, but over both elements. Using a very simple notation, this difference can be represented as in (35).

(35)   a.   *[the actor] [Orson Welles]
           *[NP] [NP$_P$]
      b.   the [actor Orson Welles]
           det [[N] [N$_P$]]

An important consequence of this assumption is that the tests of semantic and syntactic omissibility and reversibility become irrelevant. The absence or presence of an element, as well as the order in which they appear, may, however, have important pragmatic implications.

4.3 Further evidence

In this section we will consider further evidence to support the view (a) that the two elements in close appositions do not have independent reference, and (b) that there are different types of close apposition. In Section 4.3.1 we will look at close appositions from the point of view of definiteness to see what the presence and function of the (definite) article can tell us about the referential status of the two elements. Similarly, in Section 4.3.2, we will consider the use of anaphoric pronouns in relation to the two nominal elements and the construction as a whole. In Section 4.3.3, we will address the question of which of the two nominal elements functions as the head of the construction. On the basis of the evidence provided, we will then propose underlying representations for each of the types distinguished; these will be given in Section 4.3.4.

4.3.1 Definiteness

In this section we will consider close appositions from the point of view of the determiner, or, more specifically, of the definite determiner, which characterizes most

of these constructions. In most existing treatments, the definite article is taken as a defining feature of close appositions. Thus, as pointed out earlier (Section 4.2.2.2), Haugen (1953) explicitly states that close appositions of the type *det + N + N$_P$* must contain the definite article, whereas others, too, act on the assumption that close appositions much at least be definite (e.g. Quirk et al. 1972, 1985; Burton-Roberts 1975; Acuña-Fariña 1996). At the same time, it is generally accepted that one of the elements is a proper noun or some other uniquely describing element, i.e. the kind of element that normally does not occur with a definite determiner. The question thus arises of where the definite determiner (or any determiner, for that matter) comes from, what exactly its function is and which element(s) it has in its scope. We will begin by pointing out a general inconsistency in the treatment of definiteness in those accounts of close apposition which propose an 'NP + NP' analysis (Section 4.3.1.1). Next we will address the role of the determiner in constructions of the type *det + N + N$_P$* (Section 4.3.1.2) and in constructions of the type *N$_P$ + det + N* (Section 4.3.1.4).

4.3.1.1 Definiteness and the 'NP + NP' analysis

As will have become clear from the previous sections, most existing theories analyse close appositions as existing of two (co-referential) NPs. The most notable exceptions are Burton-Roberts (1975) and Acuña-Fariña (1996), who analyse constructions of the type *the poet Burns* as consisting of two non-referential nominal elements, both of which are in the scope of the definite article. Unlike Burton-Roberts, however, Acuña-Fariña (1996) does not extend this analysis to close appositions containing a possessive pronoun; instead he proposes to analyse constructions like *my friend Burns* and *my friend the poet* as consisting of two NPs, i.e. with the possessive pronoun as having scope over the first element only (see also Section 4.3.1.3).

On further reflection, however, the 'NP + NP' analysis is inherently contradictory. If the presence of a definite determiner serves to indicate uniqueness or identifiability of the referent of the NP, this referent must be assumed to be uniquely identifiable on the basis of the information given in this NP. More specifically, it is not logical to suggest that the definiteness of an NP depends on information which falls outside the scope of the definite determiner. In other words, if in constructions like *the poet Burns* or *the word recession* both parts of the close appositions are independently referring definite NPs, then the referents of both these NPs should be identifiable without resort to information outside these NPs. Clearly, however, this is not the case. In the constructions mentioned, the definite NPs *the poet* and *the word* cannot, in the same context, by themselves refer (equally) successfully to the referent of the construction as a whole, while in a construction like *my friend the poet*, neither element can by itself uniquely identify the intended referent for the hearer.

From this we conclude that, as a felicitous use of the definite article depends on the presence of both nominal elements, it must have both these elements in its scope. We therefore propose to analyse these construction accordingly, i.e. as definite NPs consisting of two nominal elements, both of which are in the scope of the definite determiner. Constructions with the definite article (Types 1a and 1b) can thus be represented as in (35b). The other constructions will be given a slightly different underlying representation; in all cases, however, it will be assumed that the two elements together form one NP, but are not themselves NPs.

4.3.1.2 Types 1a&b: *det + N + N$_{(P)}$*

Hawkins (1978: 146) is one of the few to include constructions like the ones in (36) in a treatment of definiteness in NPs.

(36) a. the colour red
     b. the name Algernon
     c. the number seven

(37) a. the fact that there is so much life on earth
     b. the conclusion that language did not exist

According to Hawkins (1978: 147), the constructions in (36) are like constructions with a clausal complement, such as given in (37), in that

(i)   the success of the definite reference depends on the presence of a modifier, on this occasion a nominal modifier; thus, *I don't like the colour/I can't stand the name* cannot be used as first-mentions;
(ii) the number seven is only possible when seven is a number; therefore, *the page one* is ungrammatical;[6]
(iii) they can only be definite.

Implicit in these statements is the assumption that we are not dealing with two NPs, but with one NP, consisting of a determiner and an extended projection of the form 'N + N' (*colour red, name Algernon* etc.). In addition, it is clear that Hawkins regards N1 as the head of the construction, with the proper noun functioning as a nominal modifier restricting the reference of N1 to exactly one.

As mentioned before, Burton-Roberts's (1975) transformational account also analyses the determiner as having scope over both nominal elements; as far as headedness is concerned, however, Burton-Roberts takes the opposite view (we will return to the matter of headedness in Section 4.3.3). In this analysis a construction like (38e) is derived from a construction containing a proper noun and a relative clause modifying this proper noun. The various steps in this derivation, given in (18), are repeated as (38) for convenience.

(38) a. [det] Burns [det] Burns be poet $\Rightarrow$
     b. [det] Burns WH be poet (relativization, obl) $\Rightarrow$
     c. the Burns who is a poet $\Rightarrow$
     d. the Burns poet (relative reduction, opt) $\Rightarrow$
     e. the poet Burns (by attribute preposing, obl)

A problem with this analysis, recognized by Burton-Roberts himself, is that at no stage in this derivation is the element *poet* specified for definiteness (note in particular that (38c) would be ungrammatical – or at least, highly questionable – with the definite instead of the indefinite article). The definite article here is neither generic nor indexical (Burton-Roberts 1975: 399); instead, Burton-Roberts rather cryptically

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[6] The corpus, however, does contain such an example, given in (i); the example is part of a scripted broadcast and there is no reason to assume that the speaker is making an involuntary mistake.

(i)   The address is on today's page of the Radio Times and on *the page six three eight* of Ceefax
     <ICE-GB:S2B-031 #113:3:A>

continues, 'it is triggered by an underlying specification in the form of relative clauses restrictively modifying the noun; these modifications may or may not appear at surface structure, depending on whether they are recoverable or not'. No further details are, however, provided to account for the presence of the definite article in these constructions.

Burton-Roberts does, however, answer the question of why the definite article appears. Thus, he explains, since it is *Burns* that is being modified, it is *Burns* that is being determined. In this respect the proper noun behaves like any modified name. The construction *the poet Burns* does not, therefore, differ from the expression in ((39b), the only difference being the form of the modifier (adjective versus adjectival noun); nor from the expression in ((39c), except for the form of the head (common noun versus proper noun). In fact, the definiteness of the apposition is in principle the same as that in any modified noun phrase (e.g. ((39d)).

(39)   a.   the poet$_{AN}$ Burns$_{PN}$
       b.   the ingenious$_A$ Chomsky$_{PN}$
       c.   the lady$_{AN}$ president$_{CN}$
       d.   the red$_A$ hat$_{CN}$

This, then, also explains why close appositions must contain a name, as it is the form of the head noun which distinguishes them from normal modified noun phrases. Secondly, Burton-Roberts argues, this accounts for the fact that these constructions cannot be indefinite: the head, being a name and therefore inherently definite, requires the definite determiner, thus ruling out such expressions as **a poet Burns*, **a friend John* or **an actor Laurence Olivier*.

Burton-Roberts's assumption that the function of the definite article in appositions does not differ from that in normal modified noun phrases is quite plausible. In this light, his conclusion that close appositions cannot be indefinite is rather surprising. It is true that proper nouns are inherently definite; it is, however, equally true that on a non-unique use this inherent definiteness can be overruled. This is clear not only from definite constructions such as (39b), but also from the acceptability of indefinite constructions in (40).

(40)   a true Forsyte; a triumphant Tony Blair; a confident Burns

There is, therefore, no reason to assume that close appositions cannot be indefinite, although it must be admitted that such constructions are the exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, they appear to be acceptable on an introductory use of the proper noun, as for instance in the examples in (41), where the indefinite article is used, and in (42), where we find an instance of indefinite (discourse-introductory) *this*.

(41)   a.   I have *a friend John who's in Linguistics with me* <ICE-GB:S1A-032 #294:2:B> (= (23c))
       b.   He also has to put up with *a soppy elder brother Robert* who is forever mooning about some girl or other and *a sister Ethel* who has all the brisk no-nonsense superiority of a true Wodehouse gel <ICE-GB:S2B-026 #14:1:A> (= (23b))
       c.   And supposing I take *a value K*, and I want to know if F X affects that value<ICE-GB:S1B-013 #128:1:A>
       d.   The next trick was to put into each of these die-holes uhm the currents which are down at the bottom there I one I two and I three which were currents at *a radio*

frequency omega modulated at *a modulation frequency P* <ICE-GB:S2A-041 #100:1:A>

(42)   Oh I remember I was talking to *this bloke Mark* some sort of ... this really old friend of mine <ICE-GB:S1A-015 #250:1:B> (= (17))

They are not, however, acceptable in other contexts which do allow for a definite determiner; contexts which, in Section 4.4, will be characterized as functionally identifying, descriptively identifying or contrastive (illustrated in examples (43a-c)). We will not discuss these examples in detail here; suffice it to say that their unacceptability can be accounted for in terms of semantic and pragmatic incompatability between the function of the indefinite article and the particular use of the construction.

(43)   a.   *The/*A number seven* is my lucky number. (functionally identifying use)
         b.   That man over there is *the/*a critic Paul Jones*. (descriptively identifying use)
         c.   That man over there is *the/*a CRITIC Paul Jones*. (contrastive use)

We may therefore conclude that the presence of a determiner, definite or indefinite, in close appositions is problematic only in an approach which conceives of 'det + N1' and the proper noun as two uniquely referring elements. However, as soon as one accepts an underlying structure of the type given in (35b), the presence of the determiner is in fact no more surprising than that in any other noun phrase; nor is its function any different (indicating (un)identifiability/(un)familiarity).

Given this analysis, what is surprising is, in fact, not so much the presence of a definite determiner, but rather the requirement that this determiner should be definite. However, if, as suggested, we let go of this requirement, close appositions show an even closer resemblance to normal noun phrases. Thus, by accepting the possibility of an indefinite determiner in close appositions, the question of where the definite determiner comes from becomes much less urgent, as, with regard to definiteness, these constructions seem to behave on a par with all other nominal constructions. Just like in other NPs, (in)definiteness in close appositions is used by the speaker as a means to indicate the (assumed) identifiability of the referent for the hearer. By using a definite determiner the speaker indicates that he assumes the entity referred to to be identifiable for the hearer (or at least sufficiently so in the given context). In the case of a close apposition, it is the combination of a proper noun and a descriptive element which is assumed to make identifiability possible. Use of an indefinite determiner, on the other hand, indicates not only unidentifiability of the referent, but, in addition, unfamiliarity of the hearer with the entity referred to; as such indefinite close appositions may be expected to be acceptable only on an introductory use (see Section 4.4.3).

4.3.1.3 Types 2a&b: *poss + N + N$_P$* and *poss + N + det + N*

Another category that needs to be mentioned here is that of close appositions containing a possessive pronoun or genitive construction. Some examples are provided in examples (44) and (45) (examples (13) and (15), respectively, repeated here for convenience):

(44) a. Well that's like *your friend Ruth* who lives with someone <ICE-GB:S1A-019 #361:1:A>

b. In fact *my mate at work Anne* was in Scotland about a couple of months ago and she was just talking about uhm with some friend of hers about London and it was the first place they said they went to <ICE-GB:S1A-098 #196:2:B>

c. In *your book Traditional Alternatives*, you say that since the early nineteen eighties a series of tensions have been evident throughout the Jewish world … <ICE-GB:S1B-047 #78:1:A>

d. An early chance for us to hear from *our guest tonight Duncan MacKenzie* <ICE-GB:S2A-003 #38:1:A>

e. And this might well be the plan for Indurain today to put away *his teammate Jean François Bernard* <ICE-GB:S2A-016 #18:1:A>

(45) a. Claudio Chiapucci outsprinting Andy Hampston with *Hampston's teammate Dag Otto Loretson* in third place <ICE-GB:S2A-016 #11:1:A>

b. this was used as a pretext by *Mohammed Ali's successor Abaz Pasha*, to retire him on quarter pay from all active service <ICE-GB:S2A-026 #31:1:A>

c. During the leadership campaign ITN will profile *Mr Hurd's wife Judy* and *Mr Major's wife Norma* <ICE-GB:S2B-003 #123:1:I>

d. It was *Britain's ambassador Sir David Hannay* who took on the thankless job of explaining why Washington and London would have nothing to do with the proposal from Paris <ICE-GB:S2B-010 #42:1:B>

e. *The BBC's diplomatic correspondent Paul Reynolds* considers the political and military ramifications of such action <ICE-GB:S2B-015 #26:1:A>

Constructions with a possessive pronoun or a prenominal genitive are generally considered to be definite (e.g. Hawkins 1978; Woisetschlaeger 1983; see also Chapter 8), with the possessive pronoun or genitive functioning as a definite determiner (e.g. Burton-Roberts 1975: 404; Quirk et al. 1985). Burton-Roberts therefore proposes to analyse possessive close apposition constructions in the same way as close appositions with the definite article (i.e. as modifier-head constructions in which the determiner has scope over both nominal elements), despite the fact that the possessive determiner cannot be derived in the same way as the definite determiner. As we saw earlier, in Burton-Roberts's proposal, *the poet Burns* was derived from an underlying NP *[det] Burns [det] Burns be poet*, which would yield *the Burns who is a poet*, which in turn might transform into *Burns the poet* (see example (18)). The construction *my friend John*, however, cannot be derived in a similar way, i.e. from the underlying NP *[det] John [John be friend] which he has*; not only would the underlying sentence, *??He has John*, be semantically marked, in addition it would yield the unacceptable intermediate structure **His John who is a friend*.

Instead, Burton-Roberts suggests that we 'differentiate between the two features of the determiner, its definiteness on the one hand and its possessiveness on the other', which allows him to postulate a different underlying structure, namely *[det] John [John be a friend which he has]*. In this case the underlying sentence, *He has friend*, is semantically acceptable, while the intermediate construction *The John who is a friend that he has/of his* is syntactically well-formed. Despite this difference between these possessive constructions and those with the definite article, Burton-Roberts nevertheless assigns both constructions the same structure, i.e. with N1 as modifier, the proper noun as head and with a determiner which has scope over both.

As we have seen, Acuña-Fariña (1996) adopts Burton-Roberts's analysis for constructions of the type *the poet Burns*. In the case of possessive constructions, however, he proposes a different analysis. This is partly inspired by the different ways

in which the two constructions are derived, partly by semantic considerations. Thus, according to Acuña-Fariña (1996: 49), 'a mere consideration of the meaning of the construction' suffices to show that the possessive pronoun does not have scope over both nominal elements:

> ... *my friend the poet* does not refer to a class of friends known as "friend the poet" or "friend-poet", but rather to "a friend of mine, who happens to be a poet". In other words, *the poet* relates to *my friend* and not just to *friend*. (ibid.)

Acuña-Fariña therefore proposes to analyse these constructions as consisting of two NPs (*my friend + the poet*).

This, however, does not mean, Acuña-Fariña (1996: 50-51) continues, that both NPs are used referentially, or that both have the same syntactic function (head of the construction). Instead, Acuña-Fariña concludes that only the first NP has is used to refer, while 'the poet is not a referend inside *my friend the poet*' (ibid.: 50). Unlike constructions of the type *the poet Burns*, Acuña-Fariña therefore proposes to analyse these constructions as head-modifier constructions in which the possessive determiner has scope only over the first noun, and where the second NP (whether a definite description or a proper noun) has an attributive function.

Our own approach, however, is to assign both constructions the same underlying representation. We agree with Acuña-Fariña that in constructions such as *my friend the poet*, it is the first noun which functions as the head, with the second element performing a modifying function. In our view, however, constructions with the definite article, such as *the poet Burns*, should be analysed in much the same way, i.e. as head-modifier constructions. The difference between the two constructions is a direct result of the difference in function between a possessive pronoun and the definite article. Like Burton-Roberts (1975: 104), we believe that it is important to differentiate the features of definiteness and possessiveness. This will be achieved by analysing the possessive pronoun not as a determiner (with scope over the NP as a whole), but as a modifier or specifier of the first noun only. After all, definiteness and possessiveness are features of a different nature: definiteness is primarily a pragmatic feature, reflecting a speaker's assumptions concerning the (un)identifiability of the referent for the hearer, while possessiveness is a semantic feature, reflecting a property of the intended referent – or, more accurately, relation between this referent and some other entity. It seems therefore plausible to assume that these two functions are performed by different linguistic elements. Thus, determiners will be taken to perform the function of expressing the assumed (un)identifiablity of a referent in a given discourse situation; possessive pronouns as performing the function of expressing a relation between the intended referent and some other entity – a relation which may, but need not, result in the identifiability of the referent.

Differentiating between the features of definiteness and possesiveness in this way also makes it possible to treat both types of close appositions in a similar way. Thus, both close appositions with the definite article and those with a possessive pronoun will be assumed to have the underlying structure given in (35b). However, since – unlike, for instance, Spanish or Italian – English does not allow the definite or indefinite article to be expressed in the presence of a possessive pronoun, these constructions are, in principle, undetermined for definiteness. This is by no means exceptional, as it is a feature they have in common with other (non-appositional) possessive NPs (Keizer 1988: ??). For instance, in a sentence like (46a), the use of the possessive pronoun *my* does not convey an assumption on the part of the speaker as to

the unique identifiability of the referent of the NP *my brother*: the person referred to may but need not be the speaker's only brother.[7] In either case, the prenominal possessive is fully acceptable, despite the availability of unambiguously definite and indefinite constructions (expressions (46a′&a″), respectively).

(46) a. My brother lives in Amsterdam.
      a′. My only brother lives in Amsterdam.
      a″. One of my brothers lives in Amsterdam.

Now, in the case of close appositions, the co-occurrence of a possessive pronoun and a modifying proper noun almost invariably restricts the set of potential referents to one, in which case the construction as a whole will be given a definite interpretation. For Acuña-Fariña (1996: 51-52), the function of the modifying NP is therefore to specify which individual is referred to by the first NP; as such it performs the same task as any other restrictive modifier following a possessive NP. The example he gives is the following:

(47) A: His friend popped in this morning.
      B: Which friend?
      A: His friend   the poet.
                       from London.
                       in the White House.
                       Burns.
                       with the weird look.
                       there.

The 'NP + NP' analysis proposed by Acuña-Fariña suffers from the same inconsistency observed in other 'NP + NP' analyses. If a possessive pronoun is a definite determiner, and if in *my friend the poet*, *my friend* is a referential NP, the referent must be assumed to be identifiable on the basis of the information given in this NP only. As pointed out before, it is not logical to suggest that the definiteness of this NP depends on information which falls outside the scope of the defininite determiner (here the possessive pronoun). Note also that it is exactly for this reason that in the non-appositional answers in (47) the element *the poet* is not analysed as an NP; i.e. the construction *his friend from London* is not analysed as consisting of a referential NP *his friend* and a PP-modifier *from London*. There is therefore little reason to assume such an analysis for the close apposition *his friend the poet*.

This inconsistency is, however, resolved when definiteness is no longer conceived of as a feature of the possessive pronoun: in that case the possessive pronoun has scope over the first noun only, indicating a relation of possession between a referent with the property 'friend' and some other entity. In combination with the presence of a post-modifying proper noun, this relation of possession may facilitate the hearer's identification of the referent of the construction as a whole; the possessive pronoun, however, does not serve to indicate this assumed identifiability.

Finally note that, as we will see later (Section 4.4), not all modifying second elements in possessive close appositions fulfil the identifying function illustrated in example (47). Consider, in this respect, the examples in (48). In all these cases, the possessive first element denotes a unique entity; and even if the hearer cannot be

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[7] Observe that this is typically the case with so-called 'inherent possessive' relations, such as kinship relations and body parts (see also Chapter 6). Note, in addition, that it is exactly this kind of possessive relation which is found in close appositions.

assumed to be familiar with the referent in question, the addition of the proper noun will not increase his/her chances of identifying the intended referent.

(48) a. Two-year old Darren had to go into care when *his mother Angela* had a mental breakdown <ICE-GB:S2B-038 #106:3:A>
      b. Six years ago she stopped teaching and retired with *her husband Ernest* to a bungalow high on a hill in a genteel part of town <ICE-GB:S2B-024 #118:2:A>
      c. They've got a pet rabbit, Laura and *her boyfriend Simon* <ICE-GB:S1A-017 #128:1:A>
      d. Plays it to *his fellow central defender David O'Leary* <ICE-GB:S2A-015 #184:1:A>

That the proper noun does not have an identifying function in these examples also becomes clear from the unacceptability of (49):

(49) a. His mother Angela.
      b. *?His mother from London.
      c. ??His mother in the White House.
      d. *?His mother with the weird look.[8]

We will return to the different uses of close appositions in Section 4.4.

4.3.1.4 Type 3: N_P + *det* + *N*

In explaining the definiteness of close appositions of the type N_P + *det* + *N* we are faced with a problem of a different order. On the approach advocated so far, this construction is not regarded as a reversed version of the construction *det* + *N* + N_P, nor as derived from this structure by placing N1 in postposition (or by preposing N2, for that matter). This means that the two constructions do not have the same underlying representation; not even at some earlier stage or deeper level. The most important difference is, of course, that in the construction N_P + *det* + *N* the definite article cannot have scope over both elements of the apposition. In the preceding section we suggested that the definite article (or any determiner) basically be seen as fulfilling the same function as in normal noun phrases; i.e. as indicating the assumed identifiability or familiarity of a referent for the hearer. However, as we also believe that this second part does not have independent reference, such an explanation does not seem available.

   As pointed out in Keizer (1992), a problem with many theories of definiteness is that they are defined strictly in terms of definite reference. This is one of the reasons why such theories have never been able to give a satisfactory explanation of the use of the definite article in so-called 'non-referential' noun phrases, such as the predicative elements in example (50) (e.g. Kuno 1070: 350; Lyons 1977: 185, 472f.; Declerck 1986, 1988)

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[8] *His mother there*, on the other hand, is ok: the deictic *there* can fulfil a uniquely identifying function without implying the existence of other entities fulfilling the description given in N1

(50)   a.   You're *the expert at this* <ICE-GB:S1A-020 #108:1:B>
       b.   My Comic Relief T-shirt'd be *the ideal garment* <ICE-GB:S1A-042 #307:1:B>
       c.   But you see I mean you mustn't flagellate yourself because her back thing, proved that she was never going to be *the easy adolescent* was she <ICE-GB:S1A-054 #203:1:A>
       d.   I wasn't exactly *the most model student here* anyway so <ICE-GB:S1A-084 #57:1:A>
       e.   And there were people who believed that Bet-El is *the site of a glorious temple* <ICE-GB:S1B-001 #40:1:A>

If, however, definiteness is viewed as a discourse function, as a pragmatic concept concerning the assumed familiarity of an entity (concrete or abstract) for the hearer, there is no reason why it should only apply to referring expressions in argument position. Such non-referential (property-assigning) elements as the predicative noun phrases in (50) also introduce discourse entities, namely the predicates denoted or properties assigned. As such these properties can also be presented as familiar or implied in the given context, or as uniquely identifiable for the hearer.

      Likewise, the second element in close appositions of the structure N_P + *det* + *N*, although not referential in the sense of referring to a particular person or thing, can nevertheless be presented as containing information familiar to the hearer, implied in or inferrable from the discourse or from the immediate or larger situation. In fact, as we will argue later, the function of N2 is typically to provide the hearer with a link between the proper noun and the discourse context; as such, the element *det* + N must indeed contain inferrable information or it will not be able to fulfil this anchoring function (cf. Prince 1981: 236; Keizer 1992: 274).

      Consider, for example, the apposition in (51). This sentence is part of a rather lengthy passage dealing with a change of occupier of Number 10 Downing Street, as Mrs Thatcher moves out, making room for the new Prime Minister, John Major.

(51)   Even *Humphrey the Cabinet cat* seems affected by the imminent change of occupier <ICE GB:S2B-003 #101:1:P>

Now, in all likelihood, the reader is not expected to know who Humphrey is; nor will (s)he be expected to know of the existence of a Cabinet cat. Nevertheless, the descriptive information provided in the NP, part of which is activated by the context, provides an unambiguous link between the entity referred to and this context. At the same time, the definite second element does not independently refer to this entity; instead it ascribes a property to the referent of the NP as a whole (for more examples, see Section 4.4.2.2).

      Now, this also enables us to account for the fact that close appositions of this type cannot be indefinite, as illustrated in the examples in (52).

(52)   a.   I have *a friend John who's in Linguistics with me* <ICE-GB:S1A-032 #294:2:B> (= (23c), (41a))
       a′.   *I have *John a friend who's in Linguistics with me*
       b.   Oh I remember I was talking to *this bloke Mark* some sort of ... this really old friend of mine <ICE-GB:S1A-015 #250:1:B> (= (17), (42))
       b′.   *Oh I remember I was talking to *Mark this bloke* ...

As an indefinite construction, N2 in the primed examples provides information that is new (unfamiliar, unidentifiable) to the hearer, and as such cannot fulfil the function of relating the entity referred to by the apposition as a whole to the discourse: as they do

not contain anchoring information, they are not felicitous in a descriptionally identifying function. We will return to the different uses of appositions and the restrictions on their use in detail in Section 4.4.

4.3.2 Anaphoric relations

In this section we will look at ways in which the form and use of anaphoric pronouns (definite versus indefinite) can help us to determine the referential status of the two elements of close appositions. If we assume that in close appositions the determiner has scope over two non-referential nominal elements, we may expect anaphoric 'reference' to these parts to take the form of the indefinite pronoun *one*, with the term as a whole functioning as the antecedent of a definite pronoun.

In putting this hypothesis to the test we are, however, faced with two problems. First, close appositions typically contain a proper noun or some other uniquely denoting element; since the indefinite pronoun *one* is typically used to indicate that two entities share a particular property, this property is not likely to be uniquely denoting. For example, the italicized NPs in (53) refer to two different object which share the property 'car'; this inevitably means that this property is not uniquely denoting.

(53) A: I'm going to buy *a new car* tomorrow.
      B: What's wrong with *the one you have now*?

Secondly, even if we can show that it is both possible and plausible for a definite pronoun to refer back to a close apposition as a whole, this does not prove that the pronoun cannot also be interpreted as being coreferential with one of the two elements only. In this section we will, therefore, simply propose a plausible account of close appositions and anaphoricity, and satisfy ourselves that such a view is compatible with the analysis thus far assumed.

4.3.2.1 Types 1a&b: *det + N + N$_{(P)}$*

Consider the examples in (54).

(54) a. I prefer the [name]$_i$ Algernon for the baby, but John prefers *another name/[one]$_i$*.
      b. $^{??}$The [name]$_i$ Algernon is *an unusual name/[one]$_i$*.

In both examples the indefinite pronoun *one* takes as its antecedent a previously mentioned nominal predicate. This is, of course, what the anaphoric pronoun *one* normally does: it picks up nominal elements that are used in an attributive function and applies them to some other entity. Clearly the anaphoric relation cannot include the determiner: the presence of another determiner in the italicized parts in (54) rules out an anaphoric relation between the pronoun *one* and the element *the name* (instead of *name*). Both the form of the pronoun and the presence of a determiner preceding this pronoun thus indicate that the anaphoric relation is one between predicates rather than between entities: both antecedent and anaphor have an attributive rather than a referring function.

Definite anaphoric pronouns are used where the antecedent is the apposition as a whole, with antecedent and pronoun both referring to the same entity.

(55) a.   I like *the name Algernon*, but John doesn't like *it*.
       b.   We gave the baby *the name Algernon*; is *that* the name you also had in mind?

In (55a&b) it will be assumed that the definite pronouns *it* and *that* take as their antecedent not just the element *name* or the element *Algernon*, but the entire constituent *the name Algernon*. Note, however, that we cannot prove that the anaphoric pronouns are not coreferential with the elements *the name* or *Algernon*.

      Occasionally, it seems to be possible for the second part of the apposition to function as the antecedent the indefinite pronoun *one*. Consider, for instance, the example in (56a), taken from the corpus. Here, the context only allows for the second part of the apposition, the element *recession*, to function as the antecedent.[9]

(56) a.   The Chancellor did not use *the word [recession]$_i$*, but his forecasts show that the country is in *one$_i$*. <ICE-GB:W2C-008 #79:3>
     a′. *...but his forecasts show that the country is in *it*.
      b.   The Chancellor did not use *[the word recession]$_i$*, but the Prime Minister did use *it$_i$*.
     b′. The Chancellor didn't want to use *the word$_i$ recession*, but couldn't think of a more appropriate *word/[one]$_i$*.

It may therefore be argued that, syntactically speaking, both nominal elements can function as the antecedent, and that it is the semantics of the predication (for instance, the selection restrictions of the verb) which determine antecedenthood. Thus, in (56b′), the pronoun *one* obviously refers to a word, not to a recession. In both cases, however, only the indefinite pronoun can be used: the definite pronoun *it* can be used to refer to the apposition as a whole, as demonstrated in example (56b), but not to the second element only, as shown in (56a′).

      In constructions of the type *the poet Burns* neither of the two nominal elements can easily function as the antecedent of the indefinite pronoun *one*; not

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[9] Note that the indexing in example (56a) is not quite correct. The anaphoric relation here exists between the two predicates, with the predicate *recession* functioning as the antecedent. The pronoun *one*, however, functions as an NP (occurs in argument position). The confusion is due to the fact that in English the pronoun *one* can function either as an anaphoric predicate (e.g. in *a serious one*) or as a complete NP, in which case it seems to be an amalgam of the indefinite article and the anaphoric predicate (although occasionally the combination *a one* is also used).

    Observe finally that in some cases definite reference to the second element seems possible, as in (i):

(i)   The Chancellor did not use the word *recession,* but he implied that *that's* what the country is going to be in before long.

However, there are certain circumstances in which the definite anaphoric pronoun *which* and the demonstrative pronouns *this* and *that* can take non-referential elements as their antecedent. One such an exception concerns nominal expressions in predicative position, as in example (ii); another exception concerns those cases where the anaphoric pronoun is used to refer to a non-specific or generic entity, as illustrated in example (iii). The example in (i) would fall in the second category.

(ii) a.   John is a *good friend*, *which* you are not.
      b.   John is a *good friend*, and that's exactly what you are not.

(iii) a.   John is a *good friend*, *which* is what I need.
      b.   John is a *good friend* and *those* are hard to come by.

surprisingly, this is in particular true of the proper noun. Consider for instance the examples in (57):

(57) a. A: We saw *the opera Turandot* last week.
          B: I don't know *that one*.
      b. A: We visited *the World War Two battleship Missouri* yesterday.
          B: I have never been on *one*; what was *it* like?

In (57a), the indefinite pronoun *one* is clearly 'coreferential' (or 'co-denotational') with the nominal element *opera*, while the definite anaphoric expression *that one* is co-referential with the construction as a whole; neither anaphoric expression can be constructed as coreferential with the proper noun only. In (57b), the indefinite pronoun is used to refer to an unidentifiable entity with the property *(World War Two) battleship*, while the pronoun *it* can be interpreted as coreferential either with the apposition as a whole or with the event of visiting.

However, as soon as the proper noun is no longer taken to refer uniquely, use of the indefinite pronoun seems possible, although the result is likely to be marked:

(58) a. No that's *the POET Burns*; I was thinking of *the OTHER one*.
      b. A: *The poet Burns* is very popular here.
          B: Is that the *one* who wrote 'Auld Lang Syne'?

In (58a), we find a constrastive use of close appositions. Obviously, the proper noun *Burns* does not have a uniquely denoting function here and the first noun *poet* and the determiner *other* serve to distinghuish between different individuals; the indefinite pronoun *one* takes as its antecedent the proper noun *Burns*. Example (58b) is ambiguous as regards the interpretation of *one*: it can be interpreted as 'coreferential' with the first element, *poet*, with the second element, *Burns*, or with both elements (*poet Burns*).

These observations make it plausible to think of close appositions as consisting of two non-referential nominal elements. Typically, these elements together uniquely determine the identity of the referent, in which case a definite determiner is used. Definite anaphoric pronouns can be used to refer back to the referents of the constructions as a whole. However, although this seems to be the most plausible interpretation, note that, with the exception of example (56a), it is difficult to prove that the pronoun is not anaphoric with an NP consisting of the determiner and the first noun only.

4.3.2.2 Type 3: $N_P + det + N$

For constructions of the type $N_P + det + N$, examining the use of anaphoric pronouns does not help us much in determining the referential status of the respective elements, as it does not seem to be possible for either of the two nominal elements to function as the antecedent of the indefinite pronoun *one*. As for the use of definite anaphoric pronouns, it seems plausible to interpret them as coreferential with the construction as a whole, rather than with either of the two parts.

4.3.2.3 Type 4: $N + N_P$

For the third type of apposition, consisting of a common bare noun followed by a proper noun, evidence is again scarce; whatever evidence there is, however, seems to

point in the same direction as for the other structures, suggesting that neither of the elements introduces its own discourse entity, only the construction as a whole.

Consider the examples in (59):

(59)   a.   Mr Smith; Dr. Jones; Lord Nelson; Professor Brown.
           b.   Brother George; Soprano Janet Baker; Lawyer Wright

In the examples in (59a), the first element consists of an (institutionalized) title (see Bell 1988: 329); in (59b) of a descriptive element indicating a relationship or occupation. As demonstrated in (60), there seems to be a difference between these two groups as far as the acceptability of anaphoric reference to the first element is concerned.

(60)   a. $^{*?}Dr_i$ *Jones* is a very competent one$_i$.
           b. $^{*?}Uncle_i$ *Giles* is a very eccentric one$_i$.
           c. $^{??}Farmer_i$ *Brown* is a very successful one$_i$.
           d. $^{?}$ *Soprano$_i$ Janet Baker* was a very famous one$_i$.

Note that in the case of titles as *Mr*, *Mrs*, *Miss* and *Ms* any anaphoric relation is excluded; the first elements here will be analysed as part of the proper noun. On the whole it seems to be the case that the higher the descriptive content of the first element, the more the construction resembles an apposition. As we will see later (Sections 4.4.2.3 and 4.3.3.3), this supports the view, presented in Quirk et al. (1985: 1319; see also Bell 1988: 329ff.), that the constructions in example (59) represent a gradient from full title (*Mr*) to appositional construction (*Soprano Janet Baker*).

Finally, here, too, anaphoric reference to the construction as a whole is unproblematic. In that case, the anaphoric pronoun will be definite. This seems to confirm the suggestion that here, too, neither part of the construction has independent reference, and that it is only the construction as a whole which functions as a referential element.

4.3.3 Headedness

Before we move on to the discourse uses of close appositions, let us briefly consider the question of which of the two nominal elements functions as the head of the construction (see also Chapter 2, Section XX). As will have become clear from the discussion so far, there is no consensus on headedness in close appositions. Various analyses have been proposed, although, apart from the omissibility test, little is offered by way of evidence. In this section we will, therefore, try and find out whether further, more objective, criteria can be found to determine (semantic and syntactic) headedness in close appositions. At the semantic level we will look at the selection restrictions of the verb, to see which of the elements comply with these restrictions, while at the syntactic level we will consider pluralization and subject-verb agreement.

4.3.3.1 Headedness in existing theories

In existing discussions of close apposition, headedness is largely determined on the basis of the rather subjective semantic notion of 'supreme importance' of one of the elements (Jespersen 1924: 96), which in turn is typically defined in terms of an ill-specified notion of omissibility. According to Jespersen,

In any composite denomination of a thing or person …, we always find that there is one word of supreme importance to which the others are adjoined as subordinates. Thus chief word is defined (qualified, modified) by another word, which in turn may be defined (qualified, modified) by a third word, etc. We are thus lead to establish different 'ranks' of words according to their mutual relations as defined or defining. In the combination *extremely hot weather* the last word *weather*, which is evidently the chief idea, may be called primary; *hot*, which defines *weather*, secondary, and *extremely*, which defines *hot*, tertiary.

Such a definition of headedness may be quite satisfactory in those cases where the competing elements belong to different syntactic categories (or 'ranks'). It may even be useful in certain N-N constructions, such as nominal compounds, where only one of the two elements really defines the entity referred to (e.g. *corkscrew*, *computer linguist*). However, where both parts belong to the same syntactic category (i.e. noun) and can be used independently to refer to the entity in question, intuitions about which element is defined and which is defining prove inadequate.

The same is true for the test often used to establish semantic supremacy: the omissibility test. As pointed out in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4, whether or not an element is omissible cannot always be taken as an indication of headedness, certainly not without a further specification of what is meant by omissibility (or, conversely, obligatoriness). This is confirmed by the different conclusions drawn on the basis of these criteria. Thus, Lee (1952) argues that in constructions of the type *det + N + N$_P$*, N1 must be the head since 'the second element is restrictive and is necessary to limit, or restrict, or define the meaning of the first.' In other words, in a construction like *the poet Burns*, the more general element *the poet* is modified by the more specific element *Burns*. The same line of reasoning is followed by Hawkins (1978: 146/147), who attributes the presence of the definite article in constructions like *the name Algernon* to 'the presence of a modifier, in this case a nominal modifier', without which the obstruction cannot be used as a first mention (*[#]I can't stand the name*).

According to Haugen (1953) and Burton-Roberts (1975), on the other hand, N1, the descriptive element, should be seen as the modifier. Haugen bases his claim on the fact that only this part can be omitted. As we have seen, however, his conclusion is incorrect, as omission of either element leads to a sentence that is both semantically and syntactically acceptable, but which, depending on the context, may be infelicitous. For Burton-Roberts (1975: 397), to say of *Burns* that it is an attribute of *the poet* is highly counterintuitive; in his transformational account, it is the proper noun which functions as the head, with the descriptive element functioning as an adjectival noun modifying this head.

Other solutions have been offered, but again with little evidence to support them. According to Hockett (1955: 101), for instance, one of the essential characteristics of appositions is the fact that there is no more justification for taking N1 as the head and N2 as the attribute than for the reverse; in fact, that there may be reason to regard both elements as attributes of each other. A similar view is expressed by Sopher (1971 : 401; 407-408), who states that 'on a notional level the apposition is neither co-ordinated nor subordinated to the subject'. Quirk et al. (1985: 1305) simply conclude that the matter cannot be resolved: 'When apposition is full apposition [e.g. *my friend Anne*], it may not be clear which of the appositives is the defining one.'

Finally, Acuña-Fariña (1996) proposes different analyses for four different types of close appositions. Constructions like *the poet Burns* are analysed as modifier-

head constructions in which the definite determiner has scope over both nominal elements. Constructions like *my friend B*urns and *the word enigma*, on the other hand, are analysed as head-modifier constructions consisting of a referential NP (*my friend*, *the word*) followed by a modifying second element. As we have shown in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.3.1.3, however, Acuña-Fariña's arguments are not always convincing. This is particularly true for his treatment of the construction *Burns the poet*. According to Acuña-Fariña (1996: 38),

> constructions like *Burns the poet* are best seen as having no constituent structure at all; that is, they are best seen as individible units, much in the same way in which full names and nicknames are usually regarded (e.g. *Neil Smith* or *The Black Prince*). We will also briefly suggest that this pattern constitutes a marginal construction type, and that therefore it cannot effectively be described in reference to the systematic behaviour of proper nouns.

Apart form the theoretical dubiousness of the final claim, it will be clear that such an approach is utterly unrevealing and unsatisfactory, and fails to account for the fact that, subject to a number of restrictions, this pattern is productive and has, as we will see in Section 4.4, a variety of meanings and uses.

All in all, the result of these discussions is far from satisfying. This may, of course, be due to that fact that, in the absence of obvious criteria and unequivocal tests, there is, indeed, no way of deciding the matter of headedness in close appositions. Before we come to any such conclusion, however, let use consider some more possible tests.

4.3.3.2 Semantic considerations

Selection restrictions of the verb are generally taken to hold between a verb and the head of a noun phrase, and may therefore serve as an indication of headedness (see Chapter 2, Section XX). In most cases both elements of the apposition are compatible with the selection restrictions imposed by the verb. In some cases, however, one of the elements, when used on its own, violates these restrictions (cf. Aruña-Fariña 1996: 43). Two examples from the corpus are given in (61).

(61)   a.   I have *a friend John who's in Linguistics with me* <ICE-GB:S1A-032 #294:2:B> (= (23c), (41a), (52a))

       b.   ... thus earning the animal *the name emperor tamarin*. <ICE-GB:W2B-021 #38:1>

In both examples, it is the first element, the descriptive part of the apposition, which fulfils the selection restrictions: one can have a friend, but not a person; one can earn a name, but not a person by that name. In fact, the selection restrictions test is nothing more than the omissibility test in special circumstances. In this case, however, the test does show a difference between the two elements: whereas N2 in the examples in (61) can be left out, N1 cannot.

What is interesting is that constructions of the type $N_P + det + N$ cannot appear in constructions like the ones in (61), even if the descriptive element is compatible with the selection restrictions of the verb. This may be taken as an indication that the different types of apposition may differ with regard to which element functions as the head.

(62)　a.　*We gave him *Algernon the name*.
　　　b.　*... thus earning the animal *emperor tamarin the name*. <adapted from ICE-GB:W2B-021 #38:1>

4.3.3.3 Morpho-syntactic considerations

On the syntactic front, too, there seems to be little evidence for determining headedness in close appositions. Nevertheless, two tests may be worth looking at: those of pluralization and subject-verb agreement (see Chapter 2, Section XX and XX).

Pluralization

In those cases where a close apposition has plural reference, N1, the descriptive element, occurs in the plural, while N2, the proper noun or uniquely describing element, commonly consists of two or more coordinated elements. Some examples are given in (63).

(63)　a.　their regimental slow march <unclear-word> written by Johann Valentine Hamm for *the Milanova sisters Teresa and Maria* <ICE-GB:S2A-011 #30:1:A>
　　　b.　Those who would see this kind of picture in a conventional linguistics text book would really imagine little Cs and Vs, or even *the words consonant and vowels* or little phoneme symbols written under here<ICE-GB:S2A-030 #81:1:A>

If, as has been suggested in discussions on headedness, the head is the morpho-syntactic locus (Zwicky 1985, 1993; Hudson 1987, 1993), this seems to suggest that N1 functions as the head of the construction. This seems to be supported by the fact that in some instances of appositions with plural reference the descriptive element appears in the plural, while the proper noun is singular.

(64)　　　the biologists Huxley

However, where the uniquely defining element allows for pluralization, both elements appear in the plural (example (65)), which suggest that the lack of a plural inflection in (63) and (64) is simply due to the fact that proper nouns, as a rule, cannot be pluralized.[10]

(65)　　　He's an in a very inadequate and dangerous source, to use if we're trying to understand, what the ancient Gauls, and *their cousins the Britons* and so on were really like <ICE-GB:S2A-022 #45:1:A>

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[10] As pointed out by Burton-Roberts (1975: 403), plural reference can also be achieved by means of a plural proper name and a singular N1, as in (i).

(ia)　　　the biologist Huxleys
(ib)　　　the lady presidents

Here, it would seem, it is the second element which qualifies for headedness. Observe, however, that his construction seems acceptable only on a contrastive reading, which, as argued before, renders their status as true appositions somewhat questionable: since the proper name is no longer uniquely denoting, and, in fact, functions like a common noun, the construction in (ia) seems to have more in common with the binominal construction in (ib) than with close appositions.

All in all, evidence from pluralization is far from unequivocal, although it seems to be more in favour of N1, the descriptive element, as the head of the construction.

Finally, note that appositions of the type $N + det + N_P$ cannot appear in the plural. Thus, the constructions in (66) are not acceptable.

(66)   *Huxley(s) the biologists; *Strauss(es) the composers

This seems to support an analysis of these constructions in which the proper noun functions as the head: since proper nouns cannot be pluralized (unless preceded by the definite article, in which case they function as common nouns), and since the plural marker must attach to the head of a construction, constructions of the type $N_P + det + N$ cannot appear in the plural.

Subject-verb agreement
In view of the preceding it will not come as a surprise that in $det + N + N_P$-constructions number agreement obtains between the descriptive element, N1, and the finite verb. In most cases, the second element will also show agreement with the verb, since, in the case of a plural N1, N2 usually consists of two or more coordinated elements (see the examples in (63)). Occasionally, however, N1 appears in the plural, while N2 does not. As shown in example (67), it is N1 which in such cases agrees with the verb.

(67)   a.   The *biologists* Huxley *were* both equally brilliant. (= (64))
        b.   I have two *friends* John, who both *work* for the same company.

More interesting are instances involving a multiple but non-coordinated proper noun or unique element; here, as shown in the primed examples in (68), these elements do not trigger a plural verb when they appear by themselves in argument position (cf. Aruña-Fariña 1996: 42)

(68)   a.   I think the uhm words unconditional withdrawal *have/*has* some uneasy echoes
              to some people <ICE-GB:S1B-027 #61:1:E>
        a′.   'Unconditional withdrawal' *has/*have* some uneasy echoes to some people
        b.   The initials C.S. stand/*stands for Clive Staples
        b.′   C.S. stands/*stand for Clive Staples.

This once again suggests that N1 functions as the syntactic head of the construction, as it is this element which exhibits number agreement with the verb.[11]

As for the other types of close construction, we already saw that the $N + det + N_P$-constructions do not allow pluralization. The fourth type of construction, the $N + N_P$-construction, can appear in the plural. As indicated before, a gradient seems to exist from constructions whose first element functions as an institutionalized title to those

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[11] Note finally that in other, related, aspects, too, N1 seems to function as the (syntactic) head of the apposition. In (ia), for instance, it is the descriptive element which agrees in number with the numeral or quantifier, while in (ib), it is again the plurality of N1 which licenses use of the expressions *together* and *each other*.

(ia)   I know *two/all* biologists Huxley.
(ib)   The biologists Huxley work *together*/despise *each other*.

which are more appositional in nature (see also examples (90) and (91)). The following observations on pluralization seem to confirm this view.

(69)   a.   There are two *Mr Smiths/Miss Parkers/*[?]Misters Smith/[??]Misses Parker*.
      b.   There are two *Dr Smiths/Lord Nelsons/Doctors Smith/Lords Nelson*.
      c.   There are two *Professor Browns/General Wilsons/Professors Brown/Generals Wilson*.
      d.   I have *two uncle Edwards/[??]cousin Georges/[?]uncles Edward/cousins George*.
      e.   There are two *[*?]farmer Browns/farmers Brown*.
      f.   There are two **critic Paul Jones's/[?]critics Paul Jones*.

Although opinions may differ as to which is more acceptable in a particular situation, on the whole the plural forms of $N + N_P$-constructions do, indeed seem to form a scale. As pointed out by Quirk et al. (1985: 313-314), in the case of titles like *Mr*, *Ms* and *Mrs*, the plural marker is attached to the proper noun (example (69a)). The same is true for *Miss*: the form *Misses Parker* may be used, but will be considered formal and old-fashioned. (Note, however, that if contrastive stress falls on the title, the second form, with the plural marker attached to the title, may be more acceptable.) In the case of (69b&c), both forms seem to be available, the second form probably being more formal than the first. In examples (69d&e), and particularly in (69f), the preference is for plurality to be marked on the descriptive element.

      Apparently, with regard to pluralization, too, titles tend to behave as part of the proper noun, with the name functioning as the head of the compound. In the appositional constructions in (69f), on the other hand, it is the descriptive element which functions as the (morpho-syntactic) head, resembling in this respect close appositions of the type $det + N + N_P$. In addition, the examples in (69) show that we are by no means dealing with a clear-cut distinction. Which of the two elements functions as the head largely depends on the extent to which the two parts together are taken to form a name. A clear illustration of this can be found with descriptions of family relationships, where acceptability on the different plural forms vary within the one and the same category (example (69d)). Where the constructions is actually used as a name, i.e. to address the people in question (e.g. *uncle Edward*), preference is for the construction as a whole to be pluralized. If, on the other hand, the first element has a descriptionally identifying use, added for the sake of the hearer (e.g. *cousin George*), the plural marker is more likely to be attached to this descriptive element.

4.3.4 Conclusion: underlying representations

If we think of close appositions as one homogeneous category, where each member has the same internal structure, the evidence for headedness may seem confusing and inconclusive. However, if we assume that there are different types of close apposition, we can discern a certain pattern, with most of the evidence neatly falling into place. The different types of close apposition can be given the following representations:

(70) • Type 1a: *det + N + N$_P$*-construction
head: descriptive element
the poet Burns   [$_{NP}$ [$_{Det}$ the] [$_{ExtN}$ [$_{N\text{-head}}$ poet] [$_{N\text{-Mod}}$Burns]]]

(71) • Type 1b: *det + N + N*-construction
head: descriptive element
the word recession   [$_{NP}$ [$_{Det}$ the] [$_{ExtN}$ [$_{N\text{-head}}$ word] [$_{N\text{-Mod}}$ recession]]]

(72) • Type 2a: *poss + N + N$_P$*-construction
head: descriptive element
my friend Burns   [$_{NP}$ [$_{ExtN}$ [my [$_{N\text{-head}}$friend]] [$_{N\text{-Mod}}$Burns]]]

(73) • Type 2b: *poss + N + det + N*-construction
head: descriptive element
my friend the poet   [$_{NP}$ [$_{ExtN}$ [my [$_{N\text{-head}}$ friend]] [$_{N\text{-Mod}}$ the poet]]]

(74) • Type 3: *N$_P$ + det + N*-construction:
head: proper noun
Burns the poet   [$_{NP}$ [$_{ExtN}$ [$_{N\text{-Head}}$ Burns] [[$_{Det}$ the] [$_{N\text{-Mod}}$ poet]]]]

(75) • Type 4: *N + N$_P$*-construction
head: descriptive element
                         if N = title, one complex proper noun
  a. *Lord Nelson*   [$_{NP}$ [$_N$ Lord Nelson]]
  b. *soprano Janet Baker* [$_{NP}$ [$_{ExtN}$ [$_N$ soprano] [$_{N\text{-mod}}$ Janet Baker]]]

The underlying representations in (70) and (71) reflect the non-referentiality of both elements and the fact that the determiner has scope over both elements (which together are represented as forming an extended nominal predicate, ExtN). The descriptive element is regarded as the head; this accounts for the fact that definiteness here is expressed through the use of the definite article. The same holds for the representations in (72) and (73), except that in these constructions the presence of a possessive pronoun in the first element blocks the appearance of the definite article.

The representation in (74) reflects the fact that in these constructions the proper noun functions as the head and that the modifying element is a non-referential expression specified for definiteness (indicating the identifiable – familiar, activated, inferrable – status of the modifying element). Since the head is a proper noun, the definiteness of the construction as a whole is intrinsic and is not expressed by means of a determiner.

Finally, the structures in (75) represent the examples of this type of construction at both ends of the scale: that in which an institutionalized title functions as part of the proper noun (given in (75a)) and that in which the descriptive element functions as the head in an appositional construction (given in (75b)). In (75a) definiteness is intrinsic; example (75b) is not specified for definiteness, as there is no assumption on the part of the speaker that the proper noun/referent in question is, or is not, familiar to the addressee (see below).

4.4 A classification of uses

In this section we will look at the different discourse functions close appositions may perform. Our intention is to show that close appositions do not only exhibit semantic

and syntactic, but also pragmatic heterogeneity, and that various uses can be distinguished.

The first use of close appositions to be distinguished is the *functionally identifying use*. Here, it will be claimed, the information supplied in the descriptive element of the apposition serves to indicate to the hearer that the uniquely defined element is not used in its usual (prototypical) function.

The second use of appositions is what we will call the *descriptionally identifying use*. The term, as indeed the notion itself, is taken from Declerck's (1988) classification of copular sentences. On this use, the descriptive element provides information which allows the hearer to relate the referent of the construction as a whole to her 'knowledge base', or, more specifically, to anchor this referent in the discourse situation.[12]

The third use, which may be seen as a special application of the descriptively identifying use, is the so-called *introductory use*. Instead of given or inferrable information, the descriptive element provides information that is contextually new, but nevertheless sufficiently informative and relevant to justify the use of a first-mention proper noun, even if the proper noun may not be expected to be familiar to the hearer.

Finally, there is the *contrastive use* of appositions, where the information in the descriptive element is used to distinguish the referent of one apposition from that of another. As we will point out, however, there may be reasons to assume that these constructions do not fully qualify as appositions.

Although there is no direct relationship between these four uses and the different types of close apposition distinguished, we will find that the different types of close appositions are used in different ways. Only the descriptively identifying and contrastive uses accept all four main types of close apposition, while, from the point of view of these types, Types 1b, 3 and 4 (*det + N + N*, *N_P + det + N* and *N + N_P*) turn out to be most restricted in their use. In what follows I will describe the four uses in detail and try to account for the restrictions observed (see also Table 1).

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[12] The fact that we borrow Declerck's (1988) notion of descriptionally identifying, does not imply any direct relationship between close appositions and copular constructions. Unlike some existing theories, we do not regard appositions as derived from constructions containing a copular relative clause. Nevertheless, the fact remains that both copular constructions and appositions contain two nominal expressions, between which a certain semantic relation exists. It seems that of these relations, the descriptionally identifying one, is shared by the two constructions. The other three types of copular sentence distinguished by Declerck (1988), identity statements, predicational copular sentences and specificational copular sentences, do not seem to have a direct parallel in close appositions. Thus, in identity statement, reference is made to two entities, whose identity is subsequently asserted to be the same; the focus is on the copular verb (*But Dr Jekyll IS Mr Hyde!*). Since close appositions do not consist of two referential parts, and since they do not contain a copular verb, this specific relation cannot be expressed in a close apposition. Predicational sentences do not proved any identifying information; the post-copular element in these sentences merely predicates a characteristic of the subject. Although this may describe the function of non-restrictive appositions of the kind *James Joyce, the author of Ulysses…*, it does not coincide with any of the uses of close appositions. In specificational sentences, finally, the post-copular element serves to specify a value for a variable (*The winner of the prize is: Paul Jones*). Although these are necessarily contrastive, their function does not seem to be identical to what we will call the contrastive use of appositions (but which may not even be true appositions).

4.4.1 The functionally identifying use

The functionally identifying use is only available for constructions of Type 1b; some examples are given in (76). At first sight these constructions may seem redundant: since we all can be assumed to know that 'four' is a number, 'blue' a colour and 'Algernon' a name, there seems no reason to add an element explicitly stating this information. A closer look at these examples, however, shows that this apparent redundancy is justified, since in all of these sentences the uniquely denoting element (*four*, *blue, J.M.*, *drop-out*, *Algernon*) does not appear in its prototypical function. Thus cardinal numbers are typically used as quantifiers, not as nouns. The same is, of course, true for colours, which are typically used as adjectives; for letters, which do not normally function as nouns; for proper names, which are normally used to refer to a person, rather than to the name itself; and similarly for regular nouns, as these are typically used to refer to some other entity, not to themselves.

(76) a. *The number four* is my lucky number.
      b. I've always liked *the colour blue*.
      c. *The letter 'E'* stands for euro.
      d. I don't care much for *the name Algernon*.
      e. I don't like to use *the word 'drop-out'*.

Consider in this respect the examples in (77), where N1 clearly has a disambiguating function. In (77c), for instance, omission of N1 will lead the hearer to interpret the description *background paintings* as referring to a set of objects, not to the description. The function of N1 is, therefore, to indicate the type of referent of the construction as a whole.

(77) a. But now even here people are beginning to come to terms with *the word unemployment* and the signs are it's going to get a lot worse before it gets any better <ICE-GB:S2B-002 #43:1:B>
      b. Even if you have never been here you may recognise *the name Avignon* <ICE-GB:S2B-027 #56:1:A>
      c. I really hate *the word background paintings* ... <ICE-GB:S1B-008 #167:3:C>

Now it is true that on a purely syntactic and semantic level, N1 may be considered superfluous: as a noun, the element *blue* can, by itself, function as an argument, in which case it will be taken to refer to the colour blue. In other words, ambiguity does not always arise, and even where it does it may be resolved in other ways. In examples (78a&b), for instance, any initial ambiguity will be resolved by the following predication, while in (78c), it is through the presence of some other element in the context that the intended interpretation can be arrived at (only words have meanings, not the entities they denote).

(78)   a.   but their the word regret *seems to be the most favourite diplomatic word* knocking around rather than anger, except in one or two Arab countries where the Jordanians as you would expect have called on uh God to protect Iraq and help it repel the aggressor <ICE-GB:S2B-014 #115:1:G>

       b.   But messenger of God if one were to analyse Malachi in that way, is an unlikely choice for any father to give his son so that one may really doubt whether *the name Malachi* is a real name <ICE-GB:S2A-036 #84:1:A>

       c.   it contains no lead, and *the word pencillus*, meaning 'little tail', refers to the brush used by the Romans to write on papyrus. <ICE-GB:W2D-016 #8:1>

       d.   Bill was saying that uhm, to use the meaning of *the word their* has changed <ICE-GB:S1A-053 #304:1:B>

Nevertheless, the fact that an element is employed in a non-default manner is likely to increase the burden for the hearer in arriving at the intended interpretation, something cooperative participants in a discourse typically want to avoid. In order to render their communication as effective as possible, discourse participants adhere to Grice's (1975) 'Cooperative Principle' (CP) (See Chapter 2, Section XX). The relevant maxims in this case are those concerned with quantity; for convenience, Grice's original maxims, as well as Levinson's (1987a: 67-68; Levinson 1987b: 401) elaboration are repeated here:

Grice's Maxims of Quantity:
1. make your contribution as informative as is required
2. do not make your contribution more informative than is required

Levinson's Q-maxim
1. *Speaker's maxim*: 'Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange.' Specifically: don't provide a statement that is informationally weaker than your knowledge of the world allows, unless providing a stronger statement would contravene the I-principle'
2. *Recipient's corollary*: 'Take it that the speaker made the strongest statement consistent with what he knows.'

Applying these maxims to the type of close appositions shows that the element N1, although syntactically and semantically redundant, is indeed required by the CP: leaving out the first element in the examples in (77) would contravene the speaker's maxim, as the hearer would interpret the appositions as referring to a different (kind of) entity. That occasionally speakers are less informative than required can, of course, not be avoided, although, as shown in example (79), they may realize that their utterance may be too little informative.

(79)   While she's doing that could you tell me what the, you were speaking a bit of uh nucleated form what the E in transcription what the C stands for. *The letter C*. <ICE-GB:S1B-002 #54-57:1:E>

As mentioned before, ambiguity does not always arise. Still, due to the non-prototypical role of some (typically salient) element in the discourse, the speaker is acting in accordance with the CP even in such examples as in (80), where the additional information in N1 does not have a direct disambiguating function, but serves to guide the hearer to the correct interpretation at very little cost.

(80) a. … and the slope of that would be *the distance L* the distance the light has travelled <ICE-GB:S2A-053 #107:1:A>

b. And what that represents of course the bottom line is the radio frequency signal uhm uhm the frequency omega uhm with a a figure of eight uh radiation pattern which is rotating at *the frequency P* <ICE-GB:S2A-041 #105:1:A>

c. Mary Jane tells me I shouldn't use *the word half-caste* <ICE-GB:S1A-080 #206:1:A>

d. You 'll notice this is a new use of *the term volunteer* <ICE-GB:S1B-002 #10:1:A>

e. And the other one says that *the sequence on the mat* is a constituent either of the type prepositional phrase, or of the type noun phrase <ICE-GB:S1B-002 #207:1:A>

g. So as long as you just use *the format key F eight* you should be able to change anything you like on that <ICE-GB:S2A-058 #80:1:A>

h. The honourable member said that he was about to announce uh he was about to make a statement referring to *the initials C S* <ICE-GB:S1B-051 #117:1:H>

Finally, it must be mentioned that the functionally descriptive use does not allow for the use of indefinite determiners. The reason for this is not hard to find, as the relation between N1 and N2 is exhaustive, and, once established, renders the reference unique. Thus, the number seven can only be a number, and as a number it has unique reference. As soon as an indefinite article is used, the construction can only be interpreted as referring, not to the number itself, but as some object identified as *the (number) seven* (example (81b)).

(81) a. *A number seven is my lucky number.

b. #A (number) seven is missing.

4.4.2 The descriptionally identifying use

The descriptionally identifying use is probably the most common use of close appositions. The term, as indeed the notion itself, is taken from Declerck's (1988) classification of copular sentences.[13] On this use, the descriptive element provides

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[13] The fact that we borrow Declerck's (1988) notion of descriptionally identifying sentences does not imply any direct relationship between close appositions and copular constructions. Unlike some existing theories, we do not regard appositions as derived from constructions containing a copular relative clause. Nevertheless, the fact remains that both copular constructions and appositions contain two nominal expressions, between which a certain semantic relation exists. It seems that of these relations, the descriptionally identifying one is shared by the two constructions. The other three types of copular sentence distinguished by Declerck (1988) – identity statements, predicational copular sentences and specificational copular sentences – do not seem to have a direct parallel in close appositions. Thus, in identity statement, reference is made to two entities, whose identity is subsequently asserted to be the same; the focus is on the copular verb (*But Dr Jekyll IS Mr Hyde!*). Since close appositions do not consist of two referential parts, and since they do not contain a copular verb, this specific relation cannot be expressed in a close apposition. Predicational sentences do not proved any identifying information; the post-copular element in these sentences merely predicates a characteristic of the subject. Although this may describe the function of non-restrictive appositions of the kind *James Joyce, the author of Ulysses…*, it does not coincide with any of the uses of close appositions. In specificational sentences, finally, the post-copular element serves to specify a value for a variable (*The winner of the prize is: Paul Jones*). Although these are necessarily contrastive, their function does not seem to be identical to what we will call the contrastive use of appositions (but which may not even be true appositions).

information which allows the hearer to relate the referent of the construction to his/her 'knowledge base' by anchoring this referent in the (linguistic or extra-linguistic) discourse situation. As such, the information provided in the descriptive element of the apposition is meant to forestall questions on the part of the hearer of the type 'Who is he/she?' or 'Tell me more about him/her'. In some contexts the descriptive element has the function of justifying any claims made in the predication in question, in which case it forestalls questions like 'Why should this be the case?'. The information is not intended to introduce the proper noun and/or referent to the hearer, nor to assert a relation between the two elements.

4.4.2.1 Types 1a & 2a: *det/poss* + N + N$_P$

On the descriptionally identifying use omitting either the descriptive part or the proper noun yields a syntactically or semantically acceptable sentence. Such an omission does, however, affect the pragmatic acceptability, or felicitousness, of the sentence in question. Using only the proper noun is likely to evoke a question like 'Who is he/she?' or a request like 'Tell me more about him/her', while omission of the proper noun is likely to result in a request for the name of the person in question. This is, of course, quite natural. In order to satisfy our first curiosity about a person, we usually want to know their name, as well as information about what they do, or who they are related to. It is for this reason that the descriptive part of these appositions usually denotes an occupation or function, or a relationship.

Let us consider some examples from the corpus. In the examples in (82) omitting one of the elements leads to a construction which is syntactically and semantically acceptable, but not felicitous in the given context. Thus, in (82a), the average listener may be aware of the fact that Tom Walkenshaw is the Jaguar boss, but this cannot be assumed to be the case. Omission of the part *the Jaguar boss* may therefore leave the hearer wondering who this person is and why he is mentioned; indeed, it is the description *the Jaguar boss* which renders the passage coherent.

(82) a. This is a really big home win for Jaguar and indeed for Silverstone because *the Jaguar boss Tom Walkenshaw* is of course the uh managing director of Silverstone Circuits the B R D C <ICE-GB:S2A-012 #90:6:A>
  b. And medical attention will immediately go out to *the rider who fell there calling the causing the stoppage of that race Mullet* <ICE-GB:S2A-012 #147:7:A>.
  c. The uh background uh to the uh matter which has been argued a and uh relied on in the Registrar's judgement uh is a confusing state of cross claims between *the debtor Mr Daniel* on the one hand a and Mr Sigrani, uh with whom he had dealings on the other <ICE-GB:S2A-069 #13:1:A>
  d. Here is *the uhm goddess Isis* leading Queen Nefertari there safely to meet *the Sun God uh Hekri* <ICE-GB:S2A-052 #38:1:A>

Similarly, in examples (82b-d), the information in the first element is essential for a proper understanding of the sentence; even in those cases where the proper noun may be assumed to be familiar, the addressee may not be aware that the description provided in N1 applies (e.g. (82b)). At the same time it will be clear that, without the proper noun, the result is not quite satisfactory either: if the addressee is familiar with the name, the most unequivocal way of referring to a person will be by using this person's name; if the addressee is not familiar with the name, it makes sense to introduce that name, if only to facilitate future reference to this person.

Close appositions containing a possessive or genitive construction are also typically used in this way. In these cases it is not only the descriptive information given in the first noun, but also the referent of the possessive pronoun or the genitive NP which serves to link the referent of the close apposition to the hearer's knowledge base. Some examples are given in (83).

(83)   a.   Well that's like *your friend Ruth* who lives with someone <ICE-GB:S1A-019 #361:1:A>
          b.   And this might well be the plan for Indurain today to put away *his teammate Jean François Bernard* <ICE-GB:S2A-016 #18:1:A>
          c.   Claudio Chiapucci outsprinting Andy Hampston with *Hampston's teammate Dag Otto Loretson* in third place <ICE-GB:S2A-016 #11:1:A>
          d.   this was used as a pretext by *Mohammed Ali's successor Abaz Pasha*, to retire him on quarter pay from all active service <ICE-GB:S2A-026 #31:1:A>

Occasionally, constructions with an anaphoric demonstrative pronoun have a descriptionally identifying use. An interesting example can be found in (84).

(84)   *This fellow Mortmann* was was really was quite heavily influenced by twentieth century ... <ICE-GB:S1A-053 #177:1:A>

Mortmann's full name has been introduced into the discourse a little earlier, but does not seem to mean much to either discourse participant. The use of *this fellow* here has the function of picking up the earlier reference (reintroducing the person referred to into the discourse) while indicating a lack of familiarity with the person referred to. Observe in this respect the oddness in a similar context of a phrase like *this fellow Shakespeare*.

The fact that descriptions like the expressions in (85) are not likely to occur can be explained along similar lines. Anyone unfamiliar with the name Joyce (in a literary context) will not be likely to gain much from the addition that he was the author of *Ulysses*; conversely, anyone familiar with the work *Ulysses* may be assumed to know the name of the author. The descriptive information provided is therefore either unrevealing or redundant.

(85)   a.   *The author of 'Ulysses' Joyce
          b.   *The Bard Shakespeare (cf. (27d))

Similarly, in (85b), anyone unfamiliar with the name Shakespeare will not be helped by the description *the Bard* (used as a uniquely describing predicate here); while for anyone conversant with the fact that Shakespeare is often referred to as the Bard, there is no need to use both the epitaph and the proper noun.

Finally, since the main purpose of the descriptively identifying use of close appositions is to link the referent of the apposition to the hearer's knowledge base, it is not surprising that these constructions are not likely to be indefinite. Clearly, unmodified indefinites and introductory *this* cannot have the required anchoring function. An exception could be those indefinites that do have an anchoring function (Prince 1981: 236), like the ones in (86). However, as these anchored indefinites are necessarily modified, appositions containing them may be rather clumsy.

(86)   a.   [?]*A friend of mine Andy* may be able to help you.
          b.   *A mate at work Tim* had the same problem.

4.4.2.2 Type 3: $N_P + det + N$

In appositions of the structure $N_P + det + N$, too, the descriptive element fulfils the function of helping the hearer to identify the name/referent by linking it to his/her knowledge base. Here, however, the definiteness of the second element indicates that, within the domain of discourse, the link is a unique one. This was illustrated before by means of example (51), here repeated as (87a), where the definite description *the Cabinet cat* relates the (assumedly unfamiliar) name Humphrey unequivocally to the given context. A similar example can be found in (87b), where the description *the Finance Director* helps the hearer identify Mr Hunt by linking the name to the discourse.

(87) a. Even *Humphrey the Cabinet cat* seems affected by the imminent change of occupier <ICE GB:S2B-003 #101:1:P>
      b. Uh, he said that uh his uh feeling was that uh Mr Hook and uh the other guy who was there who uh was *Mr Hunt the Finance Director* were uh talking about two different things to him at this meeting that Mr Hook was saying that he was interested in the further expansion of the Fernale bus Ferndale business <ICE - GB:S2A-070 #26:1:A>
      c. <in a commentary of a horse race> And uh the pace should be injected by *Lord Chalmer the front runner* <ICE-GB:S2A-006 #59:2:A>

A special case is (87c), where the proper noun may be assumed to be familiar, having been introduced earlier in the discourse. In such cases, the descriptive element may be used to justify a claim made by the speaker. In this example, the name *Lord Chalmer* can be assumed to be familiar; the descriptive element *front runner*, however, functions to explain why it is that this horse should inject the pace. Here, too, the concept denoted is unique within the given context, as every race has but one front runner.

In other cases, the property denoted by N2 can be assumed to be identifiable on the basis of general knowledge. Thus, in examples (88a&b), the descriptive element denotes a stereotype; it activates the unique concepts 'loner' and 'meddler' etc. which form part of the hearer's long-term knowledge base. Note that, in addition, these notions do not introduce totally new concepts, but again serve to link the referent to the discourse situation.

(88) a. There are charges that these culminated in the kidnapping and execution of former Premier Aldo Moro, whose insistence on defying an American veto on admitting Communists into the Cabinet infuriated Washington. Defying Andreotti and the Christian Democrat right, Moro was on the way to Parliament with the deal fixed when he was kidnapped. William Colby, CIA chief of the day, claimed recently that his agency had spent nearly $100 million 'supporting politicians'. But *Moro the loner* was not for sale. <ICE-GB:W2C-010 #26-29:1>
      b. "Ha! You put me off, do you?" said our new visitor, taking a step forward and shaking his hunting-crop. "I know you, you scoundrel! I have heard of you before. You are *Holmes the meddler*." My friend smiled. "*Holmes the busybody*!" His smile broadened. "*Holmes the Scotland Yard Jack-in-office*!" (*Arthur Conan Doyle*, The Speckled Band)

In (88a) the proper noun, *Moro*, has been introduced in the discourse and may therefore be assumed to be known to the reader. The descriptive element here (*the*

loner) functions to provide further information about the referent, by supplying a property, 'loner', which not only activates a unique concept (the stereotypical loner), but which in addition provides a link with the preceding discourse. The same can be said of the descriptive elements *the meddler*, *the busybody* and *the Scotland Yard Jack-in-office* in (88b). It may be argued that it is on this use that the second element may lose its discourse connection to become more of a general characterization, serving as a nickname or as part of the proper noun: *Edward the Confessor*, *William the Conqueror* or *Charles the Simple*.

Observe that this analysis accounts for the fact that close appositions with a uniquely denoting element (rather than a proper noun) do not allow for the descriptively identifying use, as illustrated in (89).

(89)   a.   *Written on the door was *four the number*
        b.   *I have always detested *Algernon the name*.
        c.   * *'E' the letter* here stands for euro.

First of all, there is little use in providing further descriptive information about such entities as a number, a name or a letter. Moreover, it is unlikely that the information in the second element will function to link the referent to the discourse context. It is therefore hard to see how the descriptive elements in these constructions can have a descriptively identifying function.

4.4.2.3 Type 4: $N + N_P$

Since in constructions of the type $N + N_P$ the first element (typically a title or rank) often has little descriptive content, these constructions are less likely to be used in a descriptionally identifying function. This is especially true in the case of full or institutionalized titles, such as given in (90), although it will be clear that even here some first elements (such as the ones in (90c)) have more descriptive force than others (e.g. the ones in (90a&b)). Those first elements that are not institutionalized titles, such as the ones in (91), on the other hand, are more likely candidates for a descriptively identifying use.[14]

(90)   a.   Mrs Smith; Sir Winston Churchill
        b.   Dr Carter; Lord Nelson
        c.   Professor Brown; General De Gaulle

(91)   a.   brother George; aunt Augusta
        b.   farmer Brown
        c.   critic Paul Jones; soprano Janet Baker

As shown by Quirk et al. (1985: 1319), the distinction between title and descriptive element in an apposition is, however, not a binary one; instead, they distinguish six stages in what can be seen as a gradient from title to apposition. These stages differ along the following parameters:

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[14] As pointed out by Quirk et al. (1985 : 1319) and Bell (1988), constructions like the ones in (91b&c) are especially found in American and New Zealand media English, where they may embody an obscure person's claim to be newsworthy (e.g. *defiant housewife Sarah Wilkinson*, *bungling criminal Neil Harper*; see Bell 1988: 330-331).

(a)   use as a vocative (e.g. *Sir, Doctor*; possible with (90a-c));
(b)   independent reference (e.g. *the professor, the farmer*; not possible with (90a&b));
(c)   use in the structure $N_P+det+N$ (possible with (91a-c), disputably with (90c), not with (90a&b);
(d)   use of a definite determiner (e.g. *the critic Paul Jones*; possible with (91b&c)).

The result is a scale from full title (example (90a)) to 'fully acceptable as an apposition' (example (91c)), while all examples in (90) are best viewed as titles, and those in (91) as appositions.[15]

Furthermore, the difference between the titles in (90), and the descriptive elements in (91) manifests itself in the simple fact that whereas the former are often used repeatedly in one text to refer to the same person, the latter are typically used only once. In view of their respective functions, this difference is, of course, not surprising: the former, as part of the name, can (though need not) be repeated interminably; the latter, on the other hand, fulfil their descriptively identifying function on their first use and are from then on redundant.

Some examples from the corpus where the first element has a descriptionally identifying function are given in (92):

(92)   a.   The staging by Francisco Negrin and *designer Anthony Baker* wittily plays off the opera house and its conventions ... <ICE-GB:S1B-044 #2:1:A>
        b.   <in a text on the exploration of the North Pole> *British explorer Sir Ranulph Fiennes* reached both Poles with support in a transglobe expedition of nineteen eighty-one <ICE-GB:S2B-024 #8:1:A>
        c.   One of his collaborators at the time was *cousin Stephen Payne* a keyboard player and expert in sound synthesis <ICE-GB:S2B-023 #18:1:A>
        d.   *Organiser and club president Fatima Whitbread*, reigning women's world champion in the javelin, said the setup was conceived last spring and that she had been seeking sponsors for several months. <ICE-GB:W2C-014 #140:6>

4.4.3 The introductory use

The introductory use of close appositions is closely related to the descriptionally identifying use. Once again the descriptive information is given to facilitate identification or make the identification process more complete. The descriptive information given, does not, however, link the name or referent to the previous

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[15] An additional test we can use to determine the apposition status of the examples in (90) and (91) is to see to what extent these constructions can themselves be part of an appositional structure (cf. Bell 1988: 329). As can be seen from the examples in (i) and (ii), this is unproblematic in all constructions of the type $N + N_P$, regardless of the status of the first element ('title' or 'apposition'), which suggests that, in all these cases, the (original) first element can function as titles, and therefore as part of the proper name: like first names, they may provide additional identifying information but they are not descriptive. Where N1 is a descriptive element, however, the result is only acceptable in the absence of a definite determiner.
(ia)   the managing director Mrs Smith
(ib)   the defendant Dr Smith
(ic)   the chairman Professor Brown

(iia)   the victim *?(my) brother George
(iib)   the witness *?(the) farmer Brown;
(iic)   the guest for tonight *?(the) critic Paul Jones

discourse, but instead provides relevant background information about a newly introduced referent. This use therefore differs from the descriptionally identifying use in the pragmatic status of the descriptive element: whereas in the descriptionally identifying use this element contains information given in or inferrable from the context, in the introductory it provides contextually new information. As we will see, the introductory use is restricted to constructions of the type $det + N + N_P$ and $N_P + N$.

4.4.3.1 Type 1a: $det+ N + N_P$

An example of a construction which can be used in this way is *the poet Burns* in (93a), where the description *poet* is not in any way related to the previous discourse. Thus, the fact that Burns was a poet is not presupposed; nor is this relation asserted. Instead, the construction in question provides just enough background for those who are not familiar with name to appreciate the relevance of the comment in the context, while for those vaguely familiar with the name, it may trigger (partial) identification. A similar example from the corpus can be found in the bit of broadcast news given in (93b), where the description *author* is quite obviously unrelated to the preceding discourse, its function being to provide the kind of background information which helps people to identify the person in question, while at the same time appreciating that many listeners will know who Roald Dahl was.

(93)   a.   <on a plaque> *The poet Burns* lived here from 1786 to 1788.
        b.   An enquiry's begun into the sinking of a trawler by a nuclear sub off the Scottish coast and *the author Roald Dahl* has died at the age of seventy-four <ICE-GB:S2B-011 #162:1:D>

Not surprisingly, indefinite appositions typically have an introductory use. Some examples are given in (94). Here the referent of the apposition is assumed to be unknown to the hearer; moreover, the description supplied does not allow the hearer to relate this entity unambiguously to his/her knowledge base, as no uniquely defining information is being given.

(94)   a.   I have *a friend John who's in Linguistics with me* <ICE-GB:S1A-032 #294:2:B>
        b.   And supposing I take *a value* K, and I want to know if F X affects that value <ICE-GB:S1B-013 #128:1:A>
        c.   Oh I remember I was talking to *this bloke Mark* some sort of this really old friend of mine <ICE-GB:S1A-015 #250:1:B>

Constructions with a first element containing a possessive pronoun cannot have an introductory use, since the pronoun will always relate the property denoted in the first element to the discourse. Where a genitive is used, an introductory use might conceivably be possible. All the examples in the corpus, however, contain a genitive NP that is either evoked or inferrable from the discourse context. Once again, this may not be surprising: in Chapter 8 we will, in fact, argue that in constructions with prenominal possessives the link between possessor and possessee is typically activated or presupposed.

4.4.3.2 Type 3: $N_P + det + N$

The introductory use is not available for constructions of the type $N_P + det + N$, where the information the descriptive element will always in some way be activated in or inferrable from the context. If such a relation is lacking, the use of these construction becomes infelicitous, as shown in example (95a&b). This shows once more that the position of the two elements in a close apposition is not arbitrary.

(95)   a.   <on a plaque> *?*Burns the poet* lived here from 1786 to 1788.
       b.   *?*An enquiry's begun into the sinking of a trawler by a nuclear sub off the Scottish coast and *Roald Dahl the author* has died at the age of seventy-four <ICE-GB:S2B-011 #162:1:D>[16]

4.4.3.3 Type 4: $N + N_P$

Appositional constructions of the type $N + N_P$ typically have an introductory use. This explains why the proper nouns used in these constructions commonly consist of both a first and a last name. Some examples are given in (96). Note that the introductory use allows the speaker to remain agnostic as to whether or not the name and/or the person referred to is familiar to the hearer. This may well explain the absence of a determiner.

(96)   a.   <first sentence of a newspaper article> *POET Laureate Ted Hughes*, 60, is recovering from a bout of shingles, a painful viral inflammation of the nervous system. <ICE-GB:W2C-020 #90:5>
       b.   The common ballpoint - invented in 1938 by *Hungarian emigré Laszlo Biró Biró*, and popularized by *Frenchman Marcel Bich* - can be used to create crisp edges on presentation drawings. <ICE-GB:W2D-016 #80:1>

The difference between these constructions and those with the definite article is very small, although, not surprisingly perhaps, in constructions with the definite article, the suggestion of familiarity with the referent on the part of the addressee seems to be stronger.

4.4.4 The contrastive use

In all four construction types the descriptive element can be used contrastively. Some examples are given in example (97) (where contrastive stress is indicated by the use of small capitals).

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[16] An apparent counterexample can be found in (i), which is the beginning of a radio interview; however, it is only plausible to assume that this interview was announced and the interviewee introduced, and that, as such, the construction in question is descriptionally identifying rather than introductory.

(i)   What is the exact mixture do you think that brought forth *Derek Jarman the the artist* into the world because you are a are a product of the the famous British public school system for one thing uh and then you went to art school and then you went into costume and set design<ICE-GB:S1B-045 #1:1:A>

(97)	a.	Who are you referring to? *The CRITIC Paul Jones* or *the AUTHOR Paul Jones*?
	b.	It is *Algernon the NAME* I don't like, not *Algernon the PERSON*.

In each construction type, the contrast expressed may be of three kinds. In the first place, there is the contrast between two entities of the same kind (e.g. two persons, as in (97a)). Secondly, the contrast may be between entities of a different kind, as in example (97b), where a name is being distinguished from a person. In the third type of contrastive use, illustrated in (98), both constructions seem to refer to the same entity (person), contrasting different properties (roles) of this person. Note, however, that in terms of discourse referents, we are dealing with two separate entities which share the name of Welles.

(98)		(In a conversation on Orson Welles:)
		The ACTOR Welles is fascinating; *the DIRECTOR Welles* is absolutely brilliant.

The question that arises is whether contrastive constructions of this kind still qualify as appositions. According to our definition, one of the elements must be a proper noun or some other uniquely denoting element. It will be clear, however, that in the examples in (97) and (98) this element is no longer uniquely denoting, but acts more or less like a common noun. The difficulty is, of course, that if they are not appositions, then what are they? Since on the whole they seem to have more in common with appositions than with any other category, we will, for the moment continue to regard them as appositions, but of a less prototypical kind.
	In addition, it is, of course, equally possible for the proper noun or uniquely describing element to be used contrastively, in which case two entities are being contrasted which share the same property.

(99)	a.	Who are we going to discuss today? *The poet BURNS* or *the poet POPE*?
	b.	but their *the word REGRET* seems to be the most favourite diplomatic word knocking around rather than ANGER, ... <ICE-GB:S2B-014 #115:1:G>
	c.	He avoids *the word PHONEME* preferring *SOUND* and this explains the title of the article <ICE-GB:S2B-049 #34:1:A>

Finally, the contrastive use of appositions does allow for an indefinite determiner, although, again, such constructions may be assumed to be rare. Here, too, contrast may be expressed between the descriptive elements (example (100a)), or between the unique elements (example (100b)).

(100)	a.	I have *a FRIEND John*, but *no COLLEAGUE* John.
	b.	What we have here is *a constituent ON THE MAT*, not *a constituent THE MAT*.

4.4.5 Summary

It will be clear that what distinguishes the four uses of close appositions is the pragmatic status of the two elements and/or the construction as a whole. The relevant distinctions are:
(i) Descriptive element: new (focal) information versus given/inferrable information;
(ii) Either element: contrastive versus non-contrastive information;

(iii) Construction as a whole: presentative focus (introducing a new discourse entity; typical function of introductory/descriptionally identifying uses) versus given discourse entity (on contrastive use)

The various possibilities are listed in Table 1 (note that where no pragmatic function is indicated, various functions are possible).

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has been an attempt at developing a unified and consistent account of the form and function of close appositions. After a discussion of some of the earlier treatments in Section 1.2, we first presented a modified list of criteria for membership of the category of close apposition. Perhaps the most crucial feature in this list is the assumption that neither nominal element of the apposition has independent reference. Instead, all close appositions are analysed as consisting of two predicating nominals both of which fall within the scope of a determiner (if present). At the same time, it was established that, although superficially similar, a distinction can be made between four main types of close apposition. The discussion of anaphoricity and (in)definiteness in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, and of headedness in Section 4.3.3, subsequently provided evidence to support this assumption. Consideration of further semantic and syntactic evidence eventually resulted in different underlying representations for these four subtypes of close construction, allowing for different head-modifier relations.

We then proceeded to examine the discourse functions of the various types of close apposition distinguished. One important finding concerned the fact that the frequently applied test of omissibility as a way of establishing which element functions as the head of a close apposition is irrelevant in terms of the semantic or syntactic acceptability of the resulting construction; instead, we argued that application of this test was meaningful only at the discourse level. Accordingly, Section 1.4 presented a classification of uses of close appositions, focussing on the communicative function of the two elements and the result of omitting either element in terms of felicitousness. In addition, the different types of close apposition previously distinguished were shown to differ with regard to the number of uses they allow.

A final conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that even in the most unified approaches conceivable, some constructions will be better examples of the category of close apposition than others. What we have to accept therefore is that there are prototypical cases, which behave in the expected manner, fulfilling all, or almost all, of the conditions for category membership, as well as less prototypical cases, which lack certain properties of the category and, which, as a result are much more difficult to classify.

Such a situation may be not be entirely satisfactory. What does lend it credence, however, is the fact that those cases where headedness is hardest to resolve are exactly those cases which may not qualify as appositions at all. Thus, the most obvious counterexamples to the general flow of evidence for headedness are contrastive constructions and constructions where the first element takes the form of a title. In both cases there is sufficient reason to doubt the full appositional status of these elements. As pointed out before, contrastive constructions do not fulfil the criterion that one of the elements be a proper noun or uniquely defined element. It is true that they contain a proper noun, but as this name is no longer uniquely defining, it

has come to function as a common noun. Similar doubts can be expressed with regard to constructions with a title as first element. One of the characteristics of close appositions is that they contain a descriptive element; since institutionalized titles do not, or hardly, contain descriptive information, these constructions clearly do not form prototypical instances of close apposition

Nor, as we have seen, are these characteristics chosen at random. In fact, the whole point of using an apposition consists in the fact that through a combination of a proper noun and a descriptive element one can produce a referring expression which is felicitous in a given context. Any construction containing an element which cannot fully fulfil either the uniquely defining or the descriptive function can, therefore, not be regarded as a good example of close apposition. In a more general sense, this means that the form of a (prototypical) close apposition is not arbitrary: within a given discourse situation, it is the most efficient linguistic means at the speaker's disposal to refer to, introduce and/or describe a particular discourse entity.